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ARTICLES
THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF FOREIGN
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
CHIMtNE

I.

KEITNER*

The immunity of foreign officials from legal proceedings in U.S. courts has drawn
significant attention from scholars, advocates, and judges in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Samantar v. Yousuf, which held that foreign official
immunity is governed by the common law rather than the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act (FSIA). The common law of foreign official immunity, which the
Samantar Court did not define, operates at the intersection of international and
domestic law, and it implicates the constitutionalseparation of powers between the
executive and judicial branches. Conflicting visions of the substance and process of
common law immunity have already emerged following the Samantar opinion and
will continue to compete until the Supreme Court revisits this issue in a future case.
At stake is not only the ability of suits to proceed againstforeign officials, but also
the relationshipbetween the executive branch and the judiciary in matters affecting
foreign affairs.
The original research into eighteenth-century practices presented in this Article
yields two important observations. First, claims that defendants acted in their official capacities did not automatically bar adjudication on the merits: Foreign officials who were neither diplomatic officials nor heads of state were on the same
"footing" as "every other foreigner" with respect to their "suability." Second, the
Executive believed that it did not have constitutionalauthority to instruct courts to
dismiss private suits on immunity grounds. Although twenty-first century advocates
might make policy arguments for blanket immunity or absolute executive
* Copyright @ 2012 by Chim~ne I. Keitner, Associate Professor of Law University of
California Hastings College of the Law. J.D., Yale Law School; D.Phil., Oxford University;
A.B., Harvard University. My thanks to Chip W. Robertson for his financial support of
faculty scholarship including this project; Josephine Mason, Mara Boundy, Philip Johnson,
Julie Stockton, and especially Zoe Overbeck for research assistance; UC Hastings law
librarian Vincent Moyer, assisted by Miriam Mueller, for helping to find needles in haystacks; and the faculty and staff of Stanford Law School for hosting me while I worked on
this project in the fall of 2010. My thanks also to archivists including Jonathan Stayer
(Pennsylvania State Archives), David Haugaard (Historical Society of Pennsylvania),
David Langbart (U.S. National Archives), Erica Peacock and Ian Strawbridge (British
National Archives), George Combs (Alexandria Library), Iren Snavely (NEHIAmerican
Philosophical Society), Katrina Krempasky (Fairfax Circuit Court), Elizabeth Pope
(National Archives and Records Administration), and others for their diligent and helpful
responses to my numerous requests. I am also grateful to colleagues who have read and
offered comments on drafts of this paper, including Curtis Bradley, William Casto, Harlan
Cohen, Geoffrey Hazard, Elizabeth Hillman, Daniel Hulsebosch, Carlton Larson, Maeva
Marcus, Richard Marcus, Jenni Parrish, Reuel Schiller, David Sloss, Beth Stephens, Jenia
Iontcheva Turner, John Witt, Ingrid Wuerth, and participants in meetings of the Bay Area
Civil Procedure Forum, the American Branch of the International Law Association, the
American Society of International Law, and the American Society for Legal History. This
Article is dedicated to the memory of David J. Bederman.
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discretion, such choices are not consistent with-let alone compelled by-the
eighteenth-centurypractices and understandings recovered here.
INTRODUCTION

I.

II.

.................................................

705

THE "SUABILITY" OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN THE

1790s ........................................
A. Waters v. Collot
...........................
B. Rose v. Cochrane....
.............
......
C. Yard v. Davis
.............................
D. Dunant v. Perroud
.........................
E. Parnell & Stewart v. Sinclair...................
F. Jones v. L6tombe
..........................

711
713
724
729
737
740
745

RECLAIMING THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CASES .......

749

CONCLUSIONS ..................................................

756

INTRODUCTION

Recent decades have seen an increase in civil claims and criminal
charges brought against individuals for conduct performed under the
actual or apparent authority of foreign governments. In the United
States, civil proceedings have become more common following the
Second Circuit's decision in Fildrtigav. Pefla-Irala,which found that a
Paraguayan general could be held civilly liable for torture occurring in
Paraguay,' and the enactment of the Torture Victim Protection Act
(TVPA), which provides a civil cause of action for torture or summary
execution committed under color of foreign law.2
In 1976, Congress enacted the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) to govern jurisdiction over foreign states and their agencies
and instrumentalities. 3 The U.S. government has consistently
1 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (followed with qualifications by Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 731-32 (2004)).
2 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 135 (2006). Other statutes conferring jurisdiction over conduct performed under color of foreign law include: Genocide
Accountability Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-151, 121 Stat. 1821 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1091(e) (Supp. IV 2006)); Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 (2006) (establishing jurisdiction for district courts to hear suits brought by
American citizens victimized by international terrorism); Torture Convention Implementation Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340B (2006); War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441
(2006); Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, 18 U.S.C. § 2442 (Supp. III 2006); AntiTerrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. § 5203 (2006) (granting district courts equitable power to
prevent aid from reaching a designated terrorist organization); Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(A) (2006), amended by Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1241, § 221 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (Supp. III 2006)) (creating an exception to the foreign sovereign immunity doctrine for state sponsors of terrorism).
3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2006)).
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maintained that foreign official immunity-as opposed to the immunity of the state itself-is a matter of common law that falls outside
the parameters of the FSIA. In 1991, the United States took this position in Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank, a suit brought against a

Philippine government official for freezing payments pursuant to
Philippine government policy. 4 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, applying
the FSIA. 5
The United States again opposed the application of the FSIA to
foreign officials in 2006, when it filed a statement of interest in Matar
v. Dichter, a civil suit against the former Director of Israel's General
Security Service for injuries caused by a military operation in Gaza. 6
In that statement, the United States cited a 1794 opinion by Attorney
General William Bradford and a 1797 opinion by Attorney General
Charles Lee as "recognizing immunity for the official acts of foreign
officials." 7 The plaintiffs disputed this characterization of the
Attorney General opinions.8 Later, as the problem of interpreting the
FSIA worked its way to the Supreme Court, Professors Curtis Bradley
and Jack Goldsmith published an article in which they cited Attorneys
General Bradford and Lee's opinions for the proposition that "suits
against foreign officials for their official acts were considered suits
against the foreign state and thus were subject to the state's immunity." 9 Bradley and Goldsmith also suggested that the Executive's
refusal to intervene in early cases brought against foreign officials was
likely due to federalism limits, rather than separation-of-powers concerns.10 When the Supreme Court held in Samantar v. Yousuf that the
common law-not the FSIA-governs the immunity of foreign
4 See Statement of Interest of the United States at 5, Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l
Bank, 734 F. Supp. 415 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (No. 86-2255) [hereinafter Statement of Interest]
(arguing that individual immunity is governed by the common law, not the FSIA).
5 Chuidian v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by
Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). The United States argued in Chuidian that "the
general rule is that an official should be shielded from personal liability for the performance of official functions." Statement of Interest, supra note 4, at 5. However, the United
States specifically reserved comment on "the possibility of extreme situations where overriding policy reasons may suggest liability is appropriate." Id. at 5-6.
6 See Statement of Interest of the United States of America at 10-18, Matar v.
Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 05 Civ. 10270) (arguing that individual
immunity is governed by the common law, not the FSIA).
7 Id. at 6.
8 Plaintiffs' Response to the Statement of Interest of the United States of America at
13-14, Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d (indicating that the court refused to discharge the defendant
in the first case, and that the Attorney General opined that the controversy in the second
case was "entitled to a trial").
9 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity and Domestic
Officer Suits, 13 GREEN BAG 137, 141-42 (2010).
10 Id. at 142 n.21.
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officials for their conduct while in office, these Attorney General
opinions from the 1790s assumed even greater salience as evidence of
historical understandings about the authority of U.S. courts to adjudicate civil claims against individuals for conduct performed under color
of foreign law."
Legal scholars have devoted substantial attention to the potential
immunity of foreign officials from domestic prosecution.12 They have
also explored the immunity of foreign states, which the FSIA currently governs.13 Yet scholars largely have failed to address how, if at
all, immunity doctrines constrain the exercise of domestic civil
11 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). For the record, I represented amici
Professors of Public International Law and Comparative Law in support of Respondents in
Samantar.Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Samantar,
130 S. Ct. 2278 (No. 08-1555). I do not currently represent any parties on remand in
Samantar or other cases involving foreign official immunity, and all the views expressed in
this Article are my own.
12 See, e.g., ELIZABETH H. FRANEY, IMMUNITY, INDIVIDUALS AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: WHICH INDIVIDUALS ARE IMMUNE FROM THE JURISDICTION OF NATIONAL COURTS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw (2011) (canvassing recent jurisprudence on official immunity
from a U.K. perspective); Luc REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND
MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (2003) (providing a detailed account of national practice

with regard to prosecutions on the basis of universal jurisdiction); Dapo Akande &
Sangeeta Shah, Immunities of State Officials, InternationalCrimes, and Foreign Domestic
Courts, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 815 (2010) (exploring the rationale for, and limits on, functional
immunity from prosecution for international crimes in the domestic courts of other coun-

tries); MAximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches
and the TransnationalProsecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2011)
(exploring the possibilities and limitations of universal jurisdiction prosecutions in light of
the role and incentives of the political branches).
13 See, e.g., ERNEST K. BANKAS, THE STATE IMMUNITY CONTROVERSY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw: PRIVATE Surrs AGAINST SOVEREIGN STATES IN DOMESTIC COURTS
(2005) (examining the acceptance of the restrictive and absolute theories of state immunity
in state practice and arguing against the uncritical acceptance of the restrictive theory);
HAZEL Fox, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (2d ed. 2008) (providing an in-depth account
of state treatment of the immunities of foreign states, with an emphasis on U.S. and U.K.
approaches). Diplomatic immunity, in contrast to the immunity of officials who are not
diplomats, has received somewhat greater attention, as has the separate but related category of consular immunity. See, e.g., E.R. ADAIR, THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF
AMBASSADORS IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES (1929) (documenting
state practice from this period); LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF
DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY (1999) (analyzing the practice of diplomatic immunity from
ancient times to the present); JULIUS I. PUENTE, THE FOREIGN CONSUL: His JURIDICAL
STATUS IN THE UNITED STATES (1926) (chronicling U.S. practice with regard to consular,
as opposed to diplomatic, immunity); ELLERY C. STOWELL, CONSULAR CASES AND
OPINIONS: FROM THE DECISIONS OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN COURTS AND THE
OPINIONS OF THE ATrORNEYS GENERAL (1909) (collecting and reprinting cases on consular immunity). Diplomatic and consular immunity are now governed by treaty. See
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261;
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S.

95.
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jurisdiction over individuals-even though civil suits comprise a significant share of the domestic adjudicatory landscape.14
In the absence of authoritative guidance, scholars have given
lower courts scant suggestions about how to handle claims to common
law immunity following Samantar.'5 In addition to submissions by the
parties and the U.S. government on remand in Samantar itself,16 there
has been a surge of scholarship on previously overlooked aspects of
foreign official immunity.' 7 However, existing scholarship has only
14 There are a few partial exceptions. See ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF
STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2008) (arguing against blanket immunity from both civil and criminal proceedings); Akande & Shah, supra note 12, at 852 (suggesting that the existence of
extraterritorial jurisdiction over certain international crimes implies a lack of both civil and
criminal immunity for such conduct); Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The
Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142 (2006)
(examining trends in the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over internationally
unlawful conduct in civil proceedings, while bracketing the related question of immunities); Mizushima Tomonori, The Individual as Beneficiary of State Immunity: Problems of
the Attribution of Ultra Vires Conduct, 29 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 261 (2001) (examining the relationship between state immunity and official immunity).
15 For an argument that the Court must have been referring to federal common law, see
Carlos M. Vdzquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the
Revisionist and the Intermediate Positionsand a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1495, 1537-38 (2011) (viewing Samantar as leaving "no doubt" that the
common law governing immunity is federal law, not state law). See also David P. Stewart,
Samantar and the Future of Foreign Official Immunity, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 633,
649 (2011) (indicating that "there may be little debate that this area is presumptively one of
federal common law").
16 The pleadings are available on the website of the Center for Justice and
Accountability, co-counsel for Bashe Abdi Yousuf. Pleadings: Yousuf v. Samantar, CM.
FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.cja.orglarticle.php?list=type&type=142 (last
updated Nov. 22, 2011). At the time of writing, the United States had submitted statements
of interest regarding foreign official immunity in two additional post-Samantar cases.
Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-342
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2011); Statement of Interest and Suggestion of Immunity of and by the
United States of America, Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 1:10mc00764 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,
2011).
17 A few short articles were published shortly before the Supreme Court heard arguments in Samantar. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9 (emphasizing that different
rules govern the immunity of foreign officials under international law and the immunity of
U.S. officials under U.S. domestic law); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign
Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D
9 (2009) (arguing that the FSIA bars human rights suits against current and former foreign
officials); Chimene I. Keitner, Officially Immune? A Response to Bradley and Goldsmith,
36 YALE J. INT'L L. ONLINE 1 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, Response], http://www.yjil.org/
docs/pub/o-36-keitner-officially-immune.pdf (arguing against interpreting the FSIA to
include natural persons who acted under color of foreign law). More authors analyzed the
issue post-Samantar. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, InternationalLaw and
the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 Sup. Or. REV. 213 (assessing the
role of customary international law in immunity determinations following Samantar);
Chimbne I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG 2D
61 (2010) [hereinafter Keitner, Common Law] (arguing that conduct-based immunity does
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scratched the surface of the available historical record.' The obvious
danger is that unsupported assertions about historical practice, if
unchallenged, can creep into judicial opinions and assume an unwarranted aura of authority.
A systematic search of Attorney General opinions, diplomatic
correspondence, and available court records from the 1790s brings to
light six civil suits in which defendants asserted "conduct-based"
immunity; that is, immunity attached to the official nature of a defendant's conduct, as opposed to the "status-based" immunity accorded
to a defendant by virtue of her official position at the time of the legal
proceedings.19 Under the law of nations, which was understood as
binding on U.S. courts as part of the general common law, diplomatic
officials benefited from absolute, status-based immunity and could not
be sued or prosecuted while in office. 20 Other current or former foreign officials, by contrast, were on the same "footing" with "every
not automatically shield all current and former foreign officials from suit); Beth Stephens,
The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669
(2011) (arguing that actions that violate clearly defined, widely accepted international
norms fall outside the scope of official authority and are therefore not entitled to common
law immunity following Samantar); Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity
Determinationsin U.S. Courts: The Case Against the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT'L L.
915 (2011) (arguing that federal common law-making, not binding executive branch determinations, should govern immunity claims following Samantar); see also Symposium,
Official and Municipal Liability for Constitutionaland International Torts Today: Does the
Roberts Court Have an Agenda?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 441 (2011); Symposium, Foreign
State Immunity at Home and Abroad, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 819 (2011); Symposium,
Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar v. Yousuf, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 555
(2011). None of these articles examines the materials explored here.
18 The historical literature on domestic official immunity has been somewhat more
extensive. For a recent contribution that also cites earlier works, see James E. Pfander &
Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills: Indemnification and Government
Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1862 (2010). The same is true of
the literature on other aspects of the eighteenth-century legal questions involving foreign
relations and constitutional powers. Examples include WILLIAM R. CASTO, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF FIGHTING SAIL (2006); David Sloss,
JudicialForeign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. Louis UNIV. L.J. 145 (2008); Ingrid
Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1683 (2009) and works cited therein at
1685 nn.5-6.
19 See Keitner, Common Law, supra note 17, at 63-65 (distinguishing between
"conduct-based" and "status-based" immunity). Recently, this distinction between absolute status-based immunity and limited conduct-based immunity led Dominique StraussKahn, the former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, to seek the
"absolute" immunity granted to a diplomat, rather than the more limited immunity that
attaches only to official acts. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Dominique
Strauss-Kahn's Motion to Dismiss at 1-2, Diallo v. Strauss-Kahn, No. 307065/2011 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Sept. 26, 2011) (on file with the New York University Law Review).
20 See, e.g., Who Privileged from Arrest, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 26 (1792) (considering the
lawfulness of the arrest of a domestic servant of the Dutch ambassador under the law of
nations and a federal statute).
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other foreigner" who came within United States territory. 21 A claim
that a defendant acted in his official capacity-a claim to conductbased immunity-did not operate as an automatic barrier to adjudication on the merits. Moreover, the Executive believed that it did not
have constitutional authority to instruct a court to dismiss a private
suit on conduct-based immunity grounds.
Whether or not one attributes controlling weight to original
understandings of conduct-based immunity, 22 it is important to ensure
that historical claims are as accurate as possible. By bringing to light
historical materials from both published and unpublished archival
sources, this Article shows that advocates of blanket jurisdictional
immunity and absolute Executive discretion cannot justify these
choices simply by asserting that "it has always been so."
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes six civil suits
brought in U.S. courts in the 1790s against individuals who claimed
that their actions had been authorized by foreign states. 23 It examines
extensive diplomatic correspondence, court records, and government
memoranda to paint the most comprehensive picture possible of how
these cases unfolded and were resolved. Part II describes how subsequent cases carried forward the original understanding of conductbased immunity as a defense on the merits rather than as a bar to
jurisdiction. Part II thereby lays a more solid historical foundation for
future research on the act of state doctrine and its relationship to
jurisdictional immunities. 24 Although twenty-first century advocates
might make policy arguments for blanket immunity or absolute
21 Suits Against Foreigners, Case of Cochran[e], 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 49, 50 (1794).
However, foreigners who were consular officials were subject only to the jurisdiction of
federal, not state, courts. See Judicial Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 13, 1 Stat. 73, 77, 80 (1789)
(providing exclusive federal jurisdiction over actions against consuls).
22 For a forceful argument against relying on original understandings in this context,
see Stephens, supra note 17, at 2702-04 (arguing that the modern common law of foreign
official immunity must take account of developments in international human rights law and
U.S. domestic law that hold officials accountable even when they acted under color of
foreign law).
23 I do not explore two criminal cases brought against foreign consuls, in part because
the underlying conduct occurred on U.S. soil. See United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714
(C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122a) (holding that Ravara, a consul from Genoa, was not privileged from indictment for sending threatening letters for extortion); Letter from Edmund
Randolph, Sec'y of State, to Christopher Gore, Att'y of the U.S. for the Mass. Dist. (May
21, 1794), in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, 19th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 277 (1826) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (referring to the
prosecution of Juteau, Chancellor of the Consulate at Boston, on charge of arming the
privateer Roland).
24 As the Supreme Court indicated in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700
(2004), the act of state doctrine can provide foreign states with a substantive defense on the
merits, based on the principle that "the courts of one state will not question the validity of

public acts (acts jure imperii) performed by other sovereigns within their own borders,
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executive discretion, such choices are not consistent with-let alone
compelled by-the eighteenth-century practices and understandings
recovered here.
I
THE "SUABILITY" OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN THE 1790s
References to early understandings of foreign official immunity
in the United States generally begin and end with the citation of two
Attorney General opinions: the first by Attorney General William
Bradford regarding a suit against Victor Collot, the former Governor
of Guadeloupe, 25 and the second by Attorney General Charles Lee
regarding a suit against Henry Sinclair, a British privateer. 26 Because
these opinions are terse, scholars and courts have offered conflicting
interpretations. 27 This Part explores previously neglected diplomatic
correspondence and court documents related to the Collot and
Sinclair cases that illuminate the meaning of these Attorney General
opinions.28 It also examines similar materials for other cases involving
claims to immunity during this period.
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, the Washington and
Adams administrations experienced internal debates about the establishment and role of federal institutions under the new Constitution.
At the same time, these administrations faced external crises,
including an undeclared naval war with France prompted and exacerbated by the United States's rapprochement with France's enemy,
Great Britain.29 Questions persisted about the role of the federal
even when such courts have jurisdiction over a controversy in which one of the litigants has

standing to challenge those acts."
25 Suits Against Foreigners, Case of Collot, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 45 (1794).
26 Actions Against Foreigners, Case of Sinclair, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1797).
27 Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 142-43 (citing the Collot and
Sinclair opinions in support of the proposition that a foreign country's agents are immune

from suit in U.S. courts), with Keitner, Response, supra note 17, at 11 (citing the Collot and
Sinclair opinions in support of the proposition that a foreign country's agents are not
immune from suit in U.S. courts unless they are diplomatic officials).
28 Remarkably, a single, brief footnote appears to be the sole twentieth-century
account of the suit against Henry Sinclair. 3 BERNARD MAYO, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL AssoCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1936, at 152 n.22 (1941), availableat
http://www.archive.org/details/annualrepotrofth027201mbp (recounting the lawsuit against

Sinclair). Accounts of Victor Collot's time in the United States focus on his reconnaissance
missions in the Ohio and Mississippi River valleys and unsuccessful attempts to have him
deported under the Alien Act. E.g., George W. Kyte, A Spy on the Western Waters: The
Military Intelligence Mission of General Collot in 1796, 34 Miss. VALLEY HisT. REV. 427,
429-31 (1947); James Morton Smith, The Enforcement of the Alien FriendsAct of 1798, 41
Miss. VALLEY HiST. REV. 85, 92-96 (1954).
29 See, e.g., JOHN C. MILLER, THE FEDERALIST ERA 1789-1801, at 210-27 (1960) (providing an account of domestic politics and international relations during this period).
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government and its constituent branches in the domestic political
order, and about the role of the United States in the international
order of European states.30 At the same time, common law procedures, largely inherited from England, were evolving and being
adapted by jurists in state and federal courts.
During this dynamic period, Attorneys General William Bradford
and Charles Lee steadfastly affirmed in three opinions3l that foreign
defendants who claimed their acts had been authorized by foreign
governments were, "with respect to [their] suability, on a footing with
every other foreigner (not a [diplomatic official]) who comes within
the jurisdiction of our courts." 32 Attorney General Lee also indicated
in a fourth opinion that there was no "doubt respecting the suability"
of a consul-general who was not a diplomat.33 These early opinions
recognized an important difference between the status-based immunity enjoyed by diplomatic officials under the law of nations (i.e.,
international law) and the conduct-based immunity sought by other
current and former officials who were subject to proceedings in U.S.
courts.
The term "suability" used in these four Attorney General opinions was unusual; it does not appear in legal dictionaries from this
period. 34 It seems to have been most closely associated with the question of whether suits could be brought against the states of the federal
union, rather than officials of foreign states. When Chief Justice John
Jay used this.term in the 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia, he remarked
that "[s]uability and suable are words not in common use, but they
concisely and correctly convey the idea annexed to them."35 The concept of "suability" in Chisholm referred to the ability of a court to
assert jurisdiction over a particular defendant-in that case, the State
30 On the connection between the internal and external dimensions of American constitutionalism, see David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuitof InternationalRecognition, 85.
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 932 (2010). Golove and Hulsebosch argue that modern understandings of American constitution-making forget that the "animating purpose" of the
American Constitution was to facilitate the acceptance of the United States as a full and
equal member of the community of "civilized states." Id.
31 Actions Against Foreigners, Case of Sinclair, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 81 (1797); Suits
Against Foreigners, Case of Cochran[e], 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 49 (1794); Suits Against
Foreigners, Case of Collot, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 45 (1794).
32 Case of Cochran[e], 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 50.
33 Consular Privileges, Case of IUtombe, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 77, 78 (1797).
34 E.g., 2 RICHARD BuRN, A NEW LAW DICrlONARY 354-55 (1792); T. CUNNINGHAM,
A

NEW

AND COMPLETE LAW

DIcrlONARY

(1765);

GILES

JACOB,

A

NEW

LAW

DICTIONARY (10th ed. 1782).
35 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470 (1793). Chisholm was argued by

Attorney General Edmund Randolph before he became Secretary of State. Id. at 419.
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of Georgia.36 The following year, Attorney General Bradford borrowed this term to refer to whether or not a foreign defendant could
be subjected to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court, and Attorney General
Lee did the same three years later.37
In addition to the four cases that gave rise to these Attorney
General opinions regarding the "suability" of foreign officials, there
are at least two other late eighteenth-century cases in which civil proceedings were initiated in U.S. courts against current or former foreign officials, giving rise to diplomatic requests for the executive
branch to intervene and stop them.38 Taken together, these six cases
illustrate that a defendant's "suability" was unaffected by the allegedly official nature of his act. In addition, the Executive repeatedly
refused to intervene to stop litigation against individual defendants,
even if those defendants had acted under color of foreign law. The
plaintiffs did not necessarily prevail on the merits. However, courts
compelled the defendants-who were arrested pursuant to writs of
capias ad respondendum-to appear and respond to the allegations
against them on penalty of forfeiting their bail. 3 9
A.

Waters v. Collot

The first noteworthy case involved George Henri Victor Collot, a
former Governor of the French colony of Guadeloupe. When the
British captured Guadeloupe, Collot surrendered on the condition
that the British transport him to the United States, which he thought

36 The word "suable" also appears to have been used at times as an adjective to qualify
certain instruments as capable of giving rise to a legal claim. See, e.g., Steel v. Duncan, 2
Yeates 113, 114 (Pa. 1796) (indicating that "until such settlement was made by the plaintiff,
the money was only suable for, in the name and for the use of the United States");
Orphan's Bond, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 144, 148 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1795) (indicating that "such
bonds are not suable by executors generally").
37 Supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38 See infra Part I.D (describing a suit brought by Dunant against Perroud in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court on September 17, 1796); 6 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 719 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1998) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY] (referring to Yard v. Ship Cassius, a case

initiated on August 5, 1795 in the federal district court of Pennsylvania). These are the only
six civil suits that are mentioned in Attorney General opinions and related diplomatic correspondence from this period. While it is possible that there were other civil suits, only
these six appear to have prompted requests for the Executive to intervene.

39 When a plaintiff filed a complaint, a court would issue a writ of capias ad
respondendum authorizing the sheriff to arrest the defendant, particularly if the defendant
posed a flight risk. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 281-83 (4th ed. 1771).
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would be a safe transit point en route back to France. 40 He was
mistaken.
Prior to fleeing Guadeloupe, Collot allegedly had abused his
authority as Governor to confiscate the American brig Kitty, owned
by one of the wealthiest men in America, Philadelphia businessman
Stephen Girard.4 ' The French privateer the Intrepid had attempted
unsuccessfully to claim the Kitty as a prize of war. Although a competent Court of Admiralty found that the Kitty lawfully belonged to
Girard, the Kitty's captain, William Waters, reported to Girard that
Collot and his intendent-general Voisin, "upon principles of pure
republicanism, by their own act," condemned the Kitty and its cargo,
leaving Waters without redress. 42
Girard complained to Citizen Le Blanc, Secretary to the French
Legation in the United States, and alleged that Collot and Voisin had
indulged in an "infamous and piratical character ... both towards my
brig Kitty and her cargo, and towards the Captain and crew of the said
vessel" by allowing them to be robbed "down to their last shirt." 43
When Captain Waters made it back to Philadelphia, he filed suit
against Collot and Voisin in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court for consequential damages, resulting in bail of 800 pounds.44
In response to Captain Waters's action, and in accordance with
applicable procedures, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued a writ
of capias authorizing the sheriff of Philadelphia County to arrest
40 Letter from Executive Council to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 3,

1794), in 2 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR
1903, CORRESPONDENCE OF THE FRENCH MINISTERS TO THE UNITED STATES, 1791-1797,
at 362 (Frederick J. Turner ed., 1903) [hereinafter CORRESPONDENCE], available at http://
www.archive.org/stream/correspondenceofOOturnrich#page/362.
41 See Affidavit of William Waters at 2, Waters v. Collot, 2 Yeates 26 (Pa. 1795) (on file
with the New York University Law Review) (referring to the capture of the Kitty by the
privateer schooner Intrepid commanded by Joseph Andre); see also GREG H. WILLIAMS,
THE FRENCH ASSAULT ON AMERICAN SHIPPING, 1793-1813: A HISTORY AND
COMPREHENSIVE RECORD OF MERCHANT MARINE LOSSES 212 (2009) (recording losses by

the Kitty).
42 2 Yeates at 27; see also Affidavit of William Waters, supra note 41 (providing an
account of Collot's actions in condemning the Kitty); Letter from William Waters to
Stephen Girard (Feb. 9, 1794), quoted in 1 JOHN BACH MCMASTER, THE LIFE AND TIMES
OF STEPHEN GIRARD: MARINER AND MERCHANT 230-31 (1918), available at http://www.
archive.org/stream/cu3l924092517014/cu31924092517014_djvu.txt (same).
43 MCMASTER, supra note 42, at 263; see also Letter from Stephen Girard to Edmund
Randolph, Sec'y of State (June 6, 1794) (on file with the New York University Law Review)
(complaining about the treatment of Captain Waters and his crew).
44 Waters v. Collot, 2 Yeates 26, 26 (Pa. 1795); see also Letter from P.A. Adet, Minister
Plenipotentiary of the French republic, to French Minister of Foreign Relations (Mar. 17,
1796), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 40, at 840 (describing the lawsuit).
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Collot and Voisin so that they could not evade the legal proceedings. 45
The day after General Collot arrived in Philadelphia en route to
France, he was arrested "in the middle of the street" and compelled to
respond to the suit.46 Collot complained about the suit to French
Minister Joseph Fauchet who, in turn, wrote to U.S. Secretary of State
Edmund Randolph. 47
Randolph referred Fauchet's letter to the U.S. Attorney General,
William Bradford. 48 In the meantime, Randolph, who had previously
served as Attorney General, wrote to Minister Fauchet:
Were it a question, upon which I was to decide, I should conceive
that the action cannot be maintained against [Collot]. It seems to be
allowable by law, that process may issue from our courts against any
person not of the Diplomatic corps, or under their protection; and
the discussion, whether he be liable or not for damages, will be
made, when the cause shall be brought on for trial[.] 49
While Randolph seemed personally sympathetic to Fauchet's objection that the action should not be "maintained," he indicated that the
suit against Collot seemed "allowable by law" because Collot was not
a diplomatic official, meaning that a court would have to determine
Collot's liability, or lack thereof, at trial.50
Attorney General Bradford issued his opinion one week later.5 '
He acknowledged Fauchet's request that the proceedings against
Collot "be stopped" on the ground that "the cause of action arose
from the seizure and condemnation of a vessel, made at Guadeloupe,
under the authority of the governor, by virtue of the powers vested in
him as such." 52 However, Bradford, who had previously served as a
45 Writ issued by Thomas McKean, Chief Justice of the Pa. Supreme Court, in a plea of
trespass on the case, signed by prothonotary Edward Burd (Apr. 19, 1794), available at Pa.
State Archives, RG-33, Records of the Sup. Ct. of Pa., E. Dist., Capias Papers, Sept. Term
1794, Part 5, #81 (on file with the New York University Law Review).
46 V. Collot, Mon Arrestation dans les Etats-Unis de L'Amerique pour fait de mon
Administration, in PRtCIS DES EVENEMENTS QUI SE SoNr PASStS A LA GUADELOUPE
PENDANT L'ADMINISTRATION DE GEORGE HENRY VICTOR COLLOT, DEPUIS LE 20 MARS,
1793 JUSQU'AU 22 AVRIL, 1794, PR8SENTP A LA CONVENTION NATIONALE 35, 35 (1795)
[hereinafter PR"CIS DES EVPNEMENTS] (author's translation).
47 See Letter from P.A. Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations (Mar. 17, 1796), supra

note 44 (referring to Fauchet's letter of June 4, 1794). I have not located a copy of the June
4 letter.
48 Letter from Edmund Randolph to U.S. Attorney General [William Bradford] (June
9, 1794), in 6 DOMESTIC LETTERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 350 (1943) [hereinafter
DOMESTIc LET-ERS], available at http://www.footnote.com/title_72/domesticlettersof_
thedepartment of/.
49 Letter from Edmund Randolph to Joseph Fauchet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the
French Republic (June 8, 1794), in 6 DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra note 48, at 349.
So Id.
51 Suits Against Foreigners, Case of Collot, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 45 (1794).
52 Id. at 46.
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judge on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, indicated that this did not
release Collot from the obligation to give bail:
From this state of facts, it does not appear to me that the defendant
has any legal claim to be privileged from arrest; nor have the judges,
on that ground, any power to stay the proceedings against him,
without the consent of the plaintiff. With respect to his suability, he
is on a footing with any other foreigner (not a public minister) who
comes within the jurisdiction of our courts. If the circumstances
stated form of themselves a sufficient ground of defence, they must,
nevertheless, be regularly pleaded; and the court will not hear them
upon motion, for the purpose of quashing the writ or setting aside
the arrest.5 3
This part of Bradford's response was clear. To the extent that the
question was Collot's "suability," the answer was that Collot could not
claim immunity from legal process once he had come "within the jurisdiction" of a U.S. court by entering the United States. As Randolph
had anticipated, Bradford indicated that the judges could not
"quash[ ] the writ" or "set[ ] aside the arrest";5 4 Collot would have to
plead his defense.
Attorney General Bradford then went on to address Fauchet's
concern that, by obliging him to give bail, the United States was
preventing Collot from returning to France. He advised Fauchet that,
as a procedural matter, Collot could probably "be relieved from" the
obligation to give bail "by citing the plaintiff ... to show his cause of
action."5 5 Bradford explained:
I am inclined to think, if the seizure of the vessel [the Kitty] is
admitted to have been an official act, done by the defendant by
virtue, or under color, of the powers vested in him as governor, that
it will of itself be a sufficient answer to the plaintiffs action; that the
defendant ought not to answer in our courts for any mere irregularity in the exercise of his powers; and that the extent of his
authority can, with propriety or convenience, be determined only by
the constituted authorities of his own nation. 56
In this part of his opinion, Bradford appears to have been offering
Collot some free legal advice. In contemporary terms, Bradford
opined that, while Collot could not claim immunity from legal process,
he could invoke the official nature of his action as an affirmative
defense.
53
54

55

Id.
Id.
Id.

56 Id.
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As a practical matter, Bradford expressed confidence that, if the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court discharged Collot from the obligation to
give bail, the plaintiff "would probably prosecute his suit no further."57 However, he insisted that the allocation of adjudicatory
authority between the United States and France in determining
Collot's liability was an issue for the Pennsylvania court-not the
executive branch-to resolve. He further insisted that "Mr. Collot
must defend himself by such means as his counsel shall advise." 58
Collot was irate about this result, and at what he perceived as
French Minister Fauchet's inadequate protests on his behalf.59 He
found the whole affair "as indecent as it was ridiculous," and argued
that he did not owe any explanation of his conduct to a U.S. tribunal.60 On September 13, 1794, consistent with Bradford's advice,
Collot's attorney William Lewis, a former judge, moved for Waters to
show cause why Collot should not be discharged on common bail-a
promise to appear before the court at a later date. 61
The litigation proceeded with what French Minister PierreAuguste Adet, who officially replaced Fauchet in June 1795, disparagingly referred to as "les lenteurs ordinaries des Tribunaux
Am6ricains": the typical slowness of American courts. 62 Jasper
Yeates, an associate justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
reported an opinion issued by that court in December 1795-more
than a year after Collot filed his motion to show cause.6 3 Alexander
Dallas reported a similar opinion.M Yeates's version of the opinion
includes counsel's arguments, which were presented by preeminent
57 Id.

58 Id.
supra note 46, at 36-37.
Id. at 36.
Motion of W. Lewis, Waters v. Collot, 2 Yeates 26 (Pa. 1795), available at Pa. State
Archives, RG-33, Records of the Pa. Sup. Ct., E. Dist., Appearance and Continuance
Docket, Jan.-Dec. 1795, at 294 (on file with the New York University Law Review). Collot
avoided jail by giving a bail bond in the sum of 800 pounds, arranged for by the French
government. Letter from P.A. Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations (Mar. 17, 1796), supra
note 44, at 840-41; see also RG-33, Records of the Pa. Sup. Ct., E. Dist., Continuance
Docket (for Phila. Cnty.), Dec. 1795-Dec. 1796, at 113 (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (recording the bail).
62 Letter from P.A. Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations (Mar. 17, 1796), supra note
44, at 841.
63 Waters, 2 Yeates 26.
64 Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247 (Pa. 1796). It is unclear whether Dallas's version is a separate but substantively similar opinion or simply the delayed re-reporting of
the earlier opinion. Unfortunately, although docket entries from the case have been preserved, written pleadings do not appear to have survived. See Letter from Jonathan R.
Stayer, Supervisor of Reference Servs., Pa. State Archives, to author (Sept. 7, 2010) (on
file with the New York University Law Review) (detailing unsuccessful searches).
59 PRPCIS DEs EVrNEMEwrs,
6
61
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jurists of the day: Peter Stephen DuPonceau and Alexander Dallas for
Captain Waters, and William Lewis and Jared Ingersoll for General
Collot. The Executive was not separately represented. It appears that
the Pennsylvania justices learned of Attorney General Bradford's
opinion when Collot's attorneys read it to them in court.65
Captain Waters's main argument was that Collot had acted ultra
vires in condemning the ship and cargo, and that "[w]hat he did, was
in abuse of the authority delegated to him by the late [French] king's
commission." 66 He argued that Collot had acted "for the benefit of a
few privateers men" rather than "on the ground of state necessity."67
Waters distinguished Collot's unlawful act in condemning the Kitty
from acts that Collot might have been authorized to perform in his
"political capacity." Waters insisted: "A governor or public officer
may be sued for contracts or outrages done by them as individuals in
an other [sic] country. Their exemption from suits is merely on
account of the exercise of their public functions, and for what they do
in their political capacity." 68 Waters's reference to "exemption from
suits," as reported by Yeates, appears to refer to the lack of personal
liability for officially authorized acts. Under this theory, an act
exceeding the defendant's lawful authority should be treated as an act
done by a private individual-not as the valid exercise of a public
function. 69
In support of his argument that Collot could be held personally
liable for his actions and should not be discharged on common bail,
Waters relied on a 1774 English case and distinguished two other
English cases. 70 These cases form part of the common law foundation
of official immunity.
The central English precedent was Mostyn v. Fabrigas, a case
brought by Anthony Fabrigas, a native Minorcan, against John
65 See Waters, 2 Yeates at 28 (indicating that "the defendant also read therefrom the
opinion of Mr. Bradford, late attorney general of the United States, as given to the secretary of State"). Bradford had died in office on August 23, 1795. See U.S. Dep't of Justice,
United States Attorneys General: William Bradford, http://www.justice.gov/ag/aghistpage.
php?id=1 (last visited Apr. 14, 2012).
66 Waters, 2 Yeates at 28.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 This theory has echoes in later jurisprudence under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). See, e.g.,
Ann Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Immunity and Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 396 (1987) (examining U.S. treatment of claims to immunity by executive, legislative,
and judicial officers sued for their allegedly wrongful acts).
70 Waters, 2 Yeates at 28 (citing Unwin v. Wolseley, (1787) 99 Eng. Rep. 1314 (K.B.); 1
Term Rep. 674; Macbeath v. Haldimand, (1786) 99 Eng. Rep. 1036 (K.B.); 1 Term Rep.
172; Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.); 1 Cowper 161).
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Mostyn, the Governor of Minorca (a British possession).71 Fabrigas
alleged that Governor Mostyn had assaulted and falsely imprisoned
him in Minorca. Mostyn presented an affirmative defense that he had
acted in the exercise of his authority as governor. The case went to
trial, and the jury found for Fabrigas. Governor Mostyn then moved
unsuccessfully for a new trial. Lord Chief Justice De Grey ruled that
Mostyn was personally liable for the injury to Fabrigas because he had
acted outside the scope of his lawful authority. 72 Mostyn appealed.
On appeal, Lord Mansfield, in a per curiam opinion, confirmed
that "prima facie the [English] court has jurisdiction," 73 and that the
trial court had properly required that Mostyn "set forth his commission [as governor] as special matter of justification," which Mostyn
had failed to do. 7 4 Waters cited this precedent in an attempt to persuade the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that Collot was personally
liable for condemning the Kitty because, like Mostyn, he had acted
outside the scope of his lawful authority as governor.
Waters then distinguished two English cases that had found
defendant officials not personally liable. Macbeath v. Haldimand
involved a claim brought by George Macbeath for the satisfaction of
several bills of exchange drawn upon General Haldimand, the
Governor of Quebec.75 Macbeath had furnished certain articles at the
request of the Lieutenant-Governor for use at a fort on Lake Huron,
in the British colony of Canada. When Macbeath sought compensation from Haldimand, Haldimand refused payment on some of the
bills. The question was whether Macbeath could hold Haldimand personally liable for payment, even though the bills were drawn on
Haldimand "as Governor and Commander in Chief."7 6
The Court of King's Bench, in another opinion by Lord
Mansfield, held that Haldimand could not be held personally liable for
the debt because "it was notorious that [he] did not personally contract."77 Recourse, if any, lay solely with the English Treasury. Waters
might have argued that this case was inapplicable because Haldimand,
unlike Collot, had been acting solely as the commercial agent of
Quebec. 78
Mostyn, 98 Eng. Rep. at 1021-22; 1 Cowper at 162.
Id. at 1026; 1 Cowper at 169 ("[B]ut the governor knew he could no more imprison
him for a twelvemonth ... than that he could inflict the torture.").
73 Id. at 1027; 1 Cowper at 172.
74 Id.
75 Macbeath, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1036-38; 1 Term Rep. at 172-75.
76 Id. at 1038; 1 Term Rep. at 175.
77 Id. at 1040; 1 Term Rep. at 180.
78 See Waters v. Collot, 2 Yeates 26, 28 (Pa. 1795) (indicating that plaintiff attempted to
distinguish Macbeath v. Haldimand).
71
72
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Waters also distinguished Unwin v. Wolseley, in which the Court
of King's Bench relied on its decision in Macbeath to find that "governors or commanders in chief [do not] make themselves personally
liable by contracts which they enter into on the part of
Government."79 Waters argued that both of these cases were distinguishable because Collot had not been exercising a lawful public function as governor when he condemned the Kitty and its cargo and
therefore could be held personally liable for the resulting loss. 80
Collot, of course, disputed these submissions and argued for discharge on common bail. He insisted that, once his authority over the
Kitty and its cargo had been established, it was inappropriate for the
Pennsylvania court to "take on themselves to judge of the regularity
of his proceedings."8 1 He appeared to accept that the court could
properly inquire into "[w]hether a particular matter was within his
commission as governor," 82 but he denied the court's authority to
determine "whether he ha[d] abused" that commission.83
Jared Ingersoll, who "asserted himself as counsel for the minister
of France," 84 supported Collot's arguments for discharge on common
bail. Ingersoll "insisted[] that the defendant, as late govenor [sic] of
an island, part of the dominions of an independent state, was not
bound to give bail for his official acts, before a foreign tribunal."85 He
invoked Lord Mansfield's statement in Mostyn that, if Governor
Mostyn had in fact "acted right according to the authority with which
he [was] invested," then "the court might have considered it as a sufficient answer" 8 6 to Fabrigas's complaint. Ingersoll further argued that
France-not Pennsylvania-was the proper forum for adjudicating
claims regarding the Kitty, based on the admiralty law principle that
the lawfulness of the condemnation of a ship as a prize can only be
challenged in the captor's courts.87
79 Unwin v. Wolseley, (1787) 86 Eng. Rep. 1314 (K.B.) 1317; 1 Term Rep. 674, 678; see
id. at 1317; 1 Term Rep. at 678-79 (holding that "the defendant only meant to contract as
the servant of government, and not to bind himself personally").
80 See Waters, 2 Yeates at 28 (indicating that the plaintiff interpreted Macbeath v.
Haldimand and Unwin v. Wolseley as providing for a very narrow "exemption from suits");
id. at 30 (arguing that Collot and Voisin did not have judicial authority).
81 Id. at 28.
82 Id. at 29.
83 Id.
84 Id. The French minister at that time was Pierre-Auguste Adet.

85 Id.

86 Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 104 Eng. Rep. 1021 (K.B.) 1028; 1 Cowper 161; see
Waters, 2 Yeates at 29 (citing Lord Mansfield as "lay[ing] down the rule" in Mostyn, 104
Eng. Rep. at 1028; 1 Cowper at 173).
87 See Waters, 2 Yeates at 29 ("If the plaintiff has been injured, his remedy must be by
an application to the executive of France, or by a pursuit of the appeal there . . . ."). For
support, Ingersoll invoked Yard v. Davis. 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 719
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Ingersoll also invoked the principle of reciprocity and raised the
specter of proceedings against U.S. officials in foreign courts:
The present governor of this state [Pennsylvania] has sent soldiers
on board of French privateers, under a requisition from the executive of the United States, to preserve the rights of neutrality. Will it
be asserted, that after his administration is expired, he could be
prosecuted therefor in the courts of France?88
In response to this argument, Captain Waters's attorneys presented
what they deemed a "more analogous" scenario and indicated that, if
the governor of Pennsylvania "should forcibly obstruct the judgment
of this court on a foreign attachment," the governor would certainly
"be responsible at the suit of the injured party, in another country,
where there was the semblance of distributive justice."89 Each side
thus attempted to support its position by choosing an analogy that
reflected its characterization of Collot's conduct in condemning the
Kitty: a lawfully authorized attempt to preserve and implement recognized rights, on the one hand, or a wanton and unlawful disregard for
the judgment of a properly constituted tribunal, on the other.
In the end, the question for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
whether Captain Waters had shown "[slufficient reasonable ground"
to bring the case before a jury, so that the jury could determine "how
far the defendant can justify his conduct, as an official character.""
The court, without opining on the merits of the suit, determined that
Waters had satisfied this burden.91 When Alexander Dallas reported
this case in 1796, he summarized the winning argument that he and
DuPonceau had made on behalf of Waters: "Whether the present
aggression was a private, or an official, act, is the gist of the controversy; and, on that point, the plaintiff is entitled to a trial; which, however, he is not likely ever to obtain with effect, if the defendant, a
traveller, is discharged on common bail." 92 Like Yeates, Dallas
reported that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that Waters had
met his burden to show cause why Collot should not be discharged on
(referring to Yard v. Davis). For a discussion of Yard v. Davis, see infra Part I.C. In
response to Ingersoll's argument that France was the appropriate forum, Dallas and
DuPonceau countered on behalf of Waters that Collot should be considered an emigrant to
the United States. Waters, 2 Yeates at 29. With respect to the scope of Collot's authority,
they argued that the King of France did not, and could not, endow Collot with judicial
authority to condemn ships or with jurisdiction over prize cases. Id. at 30. Finally, they
argued that discharging Collot would leave Waters without a remedy and undermine the
purpose of endowing U.S. courts with jurisdiction over cases involving U.S. ships. Id. at 30.
88 Waters, 2 Yeates at 29.
89 Id. at 30.
90 Id. at 31.
91 Id.
92

Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 247, 248 (1796).
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common bail. Dallas also reported the court's admonition that: "[I]t
must not be understood, that, by this decision, we give any countenance to an opinion, that [Collot] is ultimately liable." 93 In order to
avoid liability, Collot would be required to appear and defend himself
in court.
As a result of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision, Collot
was required to remain in the United States to avoid forfeiting his
bail. Fauchet's successor Adet described the court's 1796 opinion as
"ridicule et contradictoire"-ridiculousand contradictory-because it

obliged Collot to pay the claimed damages (in the form of forfeited
bail) unless he could prove that he had been lawfully authorized as
governor to confiscate the Kitty and its cargo. 94 The Executive's
refusal to intervene to stop the case infuriated Adet,95 and he doubted
the Attorney General's good faith. 96 Perhaps for this reason, Adet felt
no compunction about profiting from Collot's unexpected sojourn in
the United States by sending him on notorious reconnaissance missions in the Ohio and Mississippi River valleys. 97
In the spring of 1797, Adet left the United States. French consulgeneral Joseph L6tombe wrote to Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering, Randolph's successor, about Collot's continued inability to
leave the United States. 98 Ltombe also provided Pickering with an
official certification from the French Directory that Collot had acted
within the scope of his lawful authority as Governor when he confiscated the Kitty, which Adet previously had refused to do. 99 In the end,
the certification-and the case-never made it to a jury. On May 29,
93 Id.

94 Letter from P.A. Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations (Mar. 17, 1796), supra note
44, at 841.
95 See id. at 842 (questioning the Executive's lack of power to intervene). Adet also was
upset about the Executive's refusal to intervene in the Cassius case. See id. (expressing
displeasure at the Executive's similar inaction with respect to the Cassius). For more information on the Cassius case, see infra Part I.C.
96 See Letter from P.A. Adet to Minister of Foreign Relations (Mar. 17, 1796), supra
note 44, at 842 (arguing that the Attorney General, by not petitioning the court, failed to
show good will).
97 See id at 842-43 (planning to take advantage of Collot's prolonged visit by sending
him on a special mission). Secretary of State Timothy Pickering called Collot an "intriguer
and bitter enemy to this country." Smith, supra note 28, at 93. For more information on
Collot's reconnaissance activities, see Durand Echeverria, General Collot's Plan for a
Reconnaissance of the Ohio and Mississippi Valleys, 9 WM. & MARY Q. 512, 512 (1952).
98 See Letter from Letombe, French Consul-General, to Delacroix, French Minister of
Foreign Relations (May 29, 1797), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 40, at 1022-23
(referring to Collot's "detention . . . on bail" in the United States).

99 There is a reference to a declaration by the Directory and to a certificate from Mr.
Ingersoll, in Letter from IUtombe, French Consul-General, to Talleyrand, French Minister
of Foreign Relations (Nov. 12, 1797), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 40, at 1079. I have
not located a copy of the certificate.
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1797, three years after Collot was arrested in Philadelphia, Pickering
finally informed L6tombe that "the friend of the plaintiff in the suit
has assured me that he will immediately withdraw it, and the General
will be discharged from his bail."100 Pickering's letter does not identify
the "friend" by name, but it could well have been the Kitty's owner,
Stephen Girard, who was facing increased pressure to abandon the
suit.101 It is also possible that the French government's official certification of Collot's authority lessened Captain Waters's confidence that
he could prevail at trial. Peter Stephen DuPonceau, representing
Waters, signed a discontinuance on June 29, 1797.102
Secretary of State Pickering opined that the protracted nature of
the proceedings was in part Collot's own fault, since "the General
refused ... to say anything more than that he was, at the time [of the
seizure], the Governor of Guadeloupe: as though a Governor could
commit no unlawful act for which he would be personally responsible." 103 Pickering's statement acknowledges the compatibility of an
official position with personal liability, but it does not elaborate on the
relationship between the two. Because Waters withdrew the suit, the
sufficiency of the French Directory's certification as "proof" of
Collot's authority was never tested in court.
The correspondence and court proceedings in Waters v. Collot
illustrate the prevailing understanding that foreigners who were not
diplomatic officials did not enjoy absolute immunity from legal process. Instead, they could present an affirmative defense at trial that
they were not personally liable for the plaintiff's injuries because they
had acted within the scope of authority conferred by a foreign government. French Minister Adet criticized this approach in his correspondence and noted the tension implicit in the idea that the exercise of
governmental authority could shield a foreign official from personal
100 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Letombe, Consul General of the French
Republic (May 29, 1797), in 10 DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra note 48, at 51-52.
101 For example, Ingersoll wrote to Girard, warning of French retaliation and urging,
"Pray think whether it is worth your while to prosecute the suit." E-mail from Iren
Snavely, Nat'1 Endowment for the Humanities Archivist, Am. Philosophical Soc'y, to
author (Feb. 3, 2011, 08:12) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (referring
to Ingersoll's letter to Girard and containing the quoted language).
102 Discontinuance, June 29, 1798, Pa. State Archives, RG-33, Records of the Sup. Ct. of
Pa., E. Dist., Discontinuance Papers, series #33.38 (Dec. 1796) (on file with the New York
University Law Review).
103 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Letombe (May 29, 1797), supra note 100, at
52; see also Letter from Letombe, French Consul General, to Delacroix, French Minister of
Foreign Relations (July 25, 1797), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 40, at 1054 (conveying Collot's good news); Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Letombe, Consul
General of the French Republic (July 26, 1797), in 10 DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra note 48,
at 90-91 (confirming discontinuance of Waters's suit against Collot).
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liability, but that the foreign official bore the burden of proving the
scope of his authority in a U.S. court.104
Waters v. Collot also illustrates the prevailing understanding of
the appropriate role of the executive branch. Despite the protracted
proceedings and persistent French objections, the executive branch
repeatedly disclaimed any authority to instruct the court to dismiss the
case. That said, the Executive was not entirely passive; it communicated information to the French authorities, managed their expectations, and may have played an informal role in encouraging Stephen
Girard and Captain Waters to abandon the claim.
B.

Rose v. Cochrane

Less than six weeks after conveying his opinion on the Waters v.
Collot case to French Minister Fauchet, Attorney General Bradford
was asked to opine on the "suability" of another foreigner who was
not a diplomatic official. The defendant was Alexander Cochrane,
previously captain of the British navy ship the Carolina and presently
captain of the Thetis. 0 5 Captain Cochrane allegedly had taken
enslaved people seeking freedom aboard the Carolina during the
evacuation of Charleston in 1782.106 When the Thetis came into port
in New York under Captain Cochrane's command in 1794, Cochrane
was arrested pursuant to a writ of capias in a suit for damages brought
in state court by Alexander Rose, who asserted ownership of one of
the enslaved men who had fled aboard the Carolina.107 Once again,
Attorney General Bradford advised that, "with respect to his
See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (describing irate letters from Adet).
Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 25, 1794), British
National Archives, F.O. 5/5 at 229 (manuscript copy on file with the New York University
Law Review), reprinted in U.S. National Archives, Notes from the British Legation, NS
1323, M.50 Roll 1.
106 Id. Thousands of enslaved people fled in this manner. See generally SIMON SCHAMA,
ROUGH CROSSINGS: BRITAIN, THE SLAVES AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2006)
(chronicling the exodus of American slaves seeking emancipation to British-controlled territory during the Revolutionary War).
107 Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 25, 1794), supra note
105. Hammond's letter refers to the plaintiff as "a Citizen of the state of South Carolina
named Rose." Id. Although I have not been able to locate the pleadings in this case, an
Alexander Rose was the plaintiff in thirteen cases brought in New York state courts
between 1793 and 1798. See Results from New York County Clerk Judgment Index
Retrieval System from Bruce Abrams, Div. of Old Records, N.Y. Cnty. Clerk's Off. to
author (on file with the New York University Law Review) (listing computerized search
results for cases brought by plaintiff Alexander Rose). Alexander Rose of Charleston,
South Carolina (1731-1801) was "a prominent merchant and planter," as recounted in BEN
LACY ROSE, ALEXANDER ROSE OF PERSON COUNTY NORTH CAROLINA AND His
DESCENDANTS 211 (1979). It is thus very likely, although not certain, that Alexander Rose
104
105

was the plaintiff in this case.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

June 2012]1

FOREIGN OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

725

suability, [Cochrane was] on a footing with every other foreigner ...
who comes within the jurisdiction of our courts." 0 8
The British Minister to the United States, George Hammond,
complained about the suit to Secretary of State Randolph. Hammond
wrote:
Captain Cochrane, though fully convinced of the frivolity and injustice of this action, and of the nature of the motives by which its
institution was dictated, was under the necessity previously to his
departure for sea, and in order to prevent the seizure of his person,
of procuring a gentleman of this City [New York] to become his
bail. 109
Hammond further alleged that he had "reason to believe, from the
information I have received, that [the suit] is a part of a preconcerted
plan formed by some individuals of this Country, for the purpose of
insulting and harassing the officers in his Majesty's service, who may
occasionally arrive in ports of the United States."o1 0 He urged
Randolph to secure "the interposition of the general government" in
order to frustrate this broader plan, "which if carried into execution,
may eventually lead to the most serious consequences.""'
Randolph referred Hammond's letter to Bradford and sought his
opinion on the Rose v. Cochrane suit. Bradford replied in terms virtually identical to those in his previous opinion about Waters v. Collot:
The Attorney General is of the opinion that it does not appear from
this state of facts that the defendant has any legal claim to be privileged from arrest, or the government any authority to interfere, so
as to stay the proceedings against him, without the consent of the
plaintiff. He is, with respect to his suability, on a footing with every
other foreigner (not a public minister) who comes within the jurisdiction of our courts, and he must answer or demur to the allegations against him.112
108 Suits Against Foreigners, Case of Cochran[e], 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 49, 50 (1794).

109 Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 25, 1794), supra note
105. On the circumstances surrounding Captain Cochrane's arrival in New York, see Letter
from George Clinton to George Hammond (July 30, 1794), British National Archives F.O.
5/5 at 236 (on file with the New York University Law Review); Letter from George
Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 30, 1794), British National Archives (manuscript
copy on file with the New York University Law Review), reprinted in U.S. National
Archives, Notes from the British Legation, NS 1323, M.50 Roll 1.
110 Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 25, 1794), supra note
105.
111 Id.
112 Case of Cochran[e], 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 49, 50 (1794). Randolph transmitted this
opinion to Hammond on August 11. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Hammond
(Aug. 11, 1794), in 7 DOMEsTIc LETTERS, supra note 48, at 153.
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Hammond specifically alleged that the suit violated Article VI of the
Treaty of Paris, 13 which had ended the Revolutionary War.
According to Bradford, even if Cochrane had a defense based on the
treaty, he "must nevertheless appear and plead it in the usual course
of judicial proceedings." 1 14 Bradford emphasized that any complaints
about the irregularity of Cochrane's arrest should be addressed to the
courts, not the Executive. He also remained firm that Cochrane's
objection to the suit should be resolved through judicial, not diplomatic, channels.115
Secretary Randolph transmitted Bradford's letter to Minister
Hammond on July 28, 1794.116 Hammond was not appeased.11 7 He
insisted that Article VI of the Treaty of Paris provided that "there
shall be no future prosecutions commenced" against any persons for
their role in the war, and that this provision constituted a "stipulation
of amnesty" for Captain Cochrane for his conduct during the evacuation of Charleston.118 He reiterated that suits brought in violation of
the treaty could not "fail to be productive of the most dangerous consequences" for Anglo-American relations.119
Attorney General Bradford responded by issuing a second
opinion that focused specifically on Hammond's treaty argument.
Bradford indicated that he had examined Article VI and concluded
that it did not apply. He explained that the term prosecution "imports
a suit against another in a criminal cause."1 20 He distinguished a prosecution initiated by the government, which he conceded would be
barred by Article VI, from a civil suit such as the one against
Cochrane, which was initiated by a private party.121 Because a civil
suit "may turn out to be free from exception,"1 22 Bradford denied that
the government had any power or reason to "prevent a citizen from
commencing" such a suit.123 He continued:
If the minister of his Britannic Majesty will have the goodness to
point out in what manner the executive authority of England could
113

105.
114

Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 25, 1794), supra note
Case of Cochran[e],1 Op. Att'y Gen. 49, 50 (1794).

It5 Id.
116 Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Hammond (July 28, 1794), British

National Archives, F.O. 5/5 at 231 (on file with the New York University Law Review).
117 Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (July 30, 1794), supra note
109.
118 Id.

119 Id.
120

Case of Cochran[e], 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 49, 51 (1794).

121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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repress the commencing of such suits in that country, I shall cheerfully revise my opinion; the laws in both countries being, on this
point, nearly the same. 124
Bradford's reliance on the analogy to English law underscores that he
was articulating a principle of executive non-interference in judicial
matters, not a principle of federal non-interference in state matters, as
some have surmised. 125 While Hammond was corresponding with
Randolph, he also sought advice from Lord Grenville, the British
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Grenville forwarded
Hammond's letter and enclosed materials to British crown advocate
Sir William Scott. 1 2 6 Scott agreed with Hammond's view that the
peace treaty provision barring prosecutions of individuals involved in
the war should be interpreted in a "liberal & favourable spirit" to
include civil suits.127 However, he acknowledged that the expression
"[pirosecutions" was "sufficiently loose and equivocal to be, at least,
capable of receiving [a stricter] [i]nterpretation." 128 He also affirmed
Bradford's understanding that neither the British nor the U.S.
Executive had the authority to interfere in a civil suit:
But it is not to be denied that a private Subject of either country has
a Right to take the opinion of his National Courts of Justice upon
this Question of Interpretation, and that the Executive government
in either has not a Right to interfere to prevent him from so
doing. 129
In Scott's view, the question of treaty interpretation was ultimately a
matter for the courts, and Bradford's strict construction of the provision barring "prosecutions" was not so far-fetched as to constitute a
treaty violation by the United States. Consequently, it was up to the
defendant to enter a "defensive Plea"-not for the Executive to direct
the suit's termination.130
Id. at 51-52.
See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 9, at 142 n.21 (suggesting that Bradford
"[p]robably" disclaimed authority to interfere in the state court proceedings because
"immunity for foreign officials had the status in the United States of general common law
rather than federal law").
126 See Letter from Sir William Scott to Lord Grenville (Dec. 13, 1794), in 1 LAW
OFFICERs' OPINIONS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE 1793-1860, at 256, 256 (Clive Parry ed.,
1970) (responding to Lord Grenville's request for his opinion about whether civil suits
against British captains violated the peace treaty).
127 Id. at 257.
128 Id. at 257-58.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 259. Scott characterized some of the suits described by Hammond as
"improper attempts of Individuals to convert a Question of Prize into a Question of civil
debt," which could not "be deemed Violations of the Law of Nations" unless the courts in
which the civil claims were brought did not dismiss the proceedings "as soon as ever the
real nature of them was fairly disclosed." Id. In accordance with the law of prize, Scott
124
125
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It is unclear what became of the claim in Rose v. Cochrane
because no court records appear to have survived.13 Other correspondence regarding Captain Cochrane during this period refers to the
highly charged accusation that Cochrane had impressed American citizens on board the Thetis, forcing them to work in the service of the
British navy.132 Rose's lawsuit did not prevent Cochrane from
resuming his pursuit of enemy ships in order to capture and claim
them as prizes. 33
The correspondence regarding Rose v. Cochrane illustrates that,
during the late eighteenth century, legal authorities in Britain and the
United States agreed that the executive branch lacked authority to
interfere with the ability of individuals to bring civil claims against
foreigners who were not diplomatic officials. This is not to say that
private litigation was insulated from foreign relations concerns. As
Minister Hammond's letters indicate, the prospect that British captains who landed in the United States could be subject to arrest in civil
suits strained diplomatic relations, leading Hammond to argue unsuccessfully that such suits were precluded by treaty.
opined that a U.S. court should dismiss a civil suit upon a defensive plea if the suit involved
the capture of a ship that had already been adjudicated as a prize by a properly constituted
admiralty court. Id.
131 Archives searched include Records of the New York Supreme Court of Judicature,
see E-mail from Bruce Abrams, Division of Old Records, N.Y. Cnty. Clerk's Off., to
author (Nov. 24, 2010, 07:58) (on file with the New York University Law Review),
describing failure to locate records in Rose v. Cochrane; microfilm records of the U.S.
District Court and U.S. Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York (as it was then
called); E-mail from Elizabeth Pope, Archivist, Nat'1 Archives & Records Admin., to
author (July 29, 2011, 08:33) (on file with the New York University Law Review); and
digests of reported state and federal cases at the New York State Library. The New York
State Archives do not have any common law trial court records prior to 1799. E-mail from
N.Y. State Archives, Reference Servs., to author (Nov. 8, 2010, 05:45) (on file with the New
York University Law Review).
132 See, e.g., Letter from George Hammond to Edmund Randolph (Sept. 3, 1794), Notes
from the British Legation, NS 1323, M.50 Roll 2 (on file with the New York University Law
Review) (responding to allegations of impressment).
133 See id. (indicating that Cochrane proceeded to Halifax). Cochrane appears to have
been sued again in New York in 1797, this time by David Gelston, a merchant who claimed
that Cochrane had unlawfully seized a ship and its cargo shortly after the Thetis left New
York in 1794. See Plea, Gelston v. Cockran [sic], RG 21, Records of the Dist. Ct. of the
United States, S.D.N.Y., Records of the Cir. Ct. (Mar. 31, 1797) (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (providing Cochrane's account of his capture of a suspected
enemy ship on November 16, 1794, and the ship's condemnation as a prize by a British
Court of Admiralty in Halifax, Nova Scotia on December 22, 1794). He was also named in
the later Forbes v. Cochrane case in England, in which the Court of King's Bench found
that an enslaved person, once on a British ship outside the territorial waters of the United
States, gained freedom. Forbes v. Cochrane, (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B.) 456; 2
Barnewall & Cresswell Rep. 448, 463.
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Although leaving matters in the courts' hands was not always a
comfortable arrangement from a diplomatic perspective, it was what
the constitutional structure dictated, as understood by key participants
at the time. As in Waters v. Collot, the burden remained on the defendant to enter a defensive plea.134 Although the Executive's inability to
direct the termination of a suit risked permitting vexatious litigation
to go forward, it also preserved U.S. courts as potential fora for claimants seeking redress for injuries caused by foreign defendants who
later entered the United States.
C. Yard v. Davis
Samuel Davis was a commissioned officer in the French navy,
even though he held U.S. citizenship.135 On August 4, 1795, the French
corvette the Cassius entered the port of Philadelphia as a public ship
of war under Captain Davis's command.136 The next day, Philadelphia
merchant James Yard filed a "libel" to initiate a civil case in admiralty
in the District Court of Pennsylvania seeking to attach the Cassius and
arrest Captain Davis. 37 Yard alleged that Davis, who "pretended an
authority from the French republic," had captured the schooner the
William Linsday, which Yard owned, and that Davis was responsible
for the financial loss that resulted when the William Lindsay and its
cargo were wrongfully detained at Port de Paix. 3 8 The Cassius was
duly attached, and Davis arrested. 139 Davis asserted immunity from
the district court's jurisdiction on the grounds that he had acted as an
agent of France.
French Minister Pierre-Auguste Adet instructed French consulgeneral L6tombe to give bail for Captain Davis, so that Davis could
avoid jail.140 From a diplomatic perspective, the proceedings against
134 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (quoting Suits Against Foreigners, Case of
Collot, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 45, 46 (1794)).
135 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 721.
136 Statement of W. Rawle [to Timothy Pickering] (Dec. 21, 1796), in 1 AMERICAN
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 637 (Walter Lowrie & Matthew St. Clair Clarke eds.,
1833) [hereinafter AMERICAN STATE PAPERS], available at http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
ampage?collld=llsp&fileName=001/llspOOl.db&recNum=4. This litigation is recounted in
the DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, because
the French government sought a writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court. 6
DOCUMENTARY

HISTORY, supra note 38, at 719-27.

137

Statement of W. Rawle (Dec. 21, 1796), supra note 136, at 637.

138

Id.
Id.

139

140 Letter from P.A. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French republic, to Mr.
Randolph, Sec'y of State of the U.S. (Aug. 9, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 136, at 629, 629; see also Letter from [Joseph [Ltombe,] French Consul at Phila., to
P.A. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French republic (24th Messidor, 3rd year of the
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the ship were apparently of greater concern than those against the
captain. However, the legal arguments relating to Captain Davis are
of greater interest to this study, because Davis objected to the court's
jurisdiction based on the allegedly official nature of his conduct.
In addition to arranging bail for Davis, Minister Adet wrote to
Secretary of State Randolph to protest the ship's attachment and
Davis's arrest. 14 1 Adet articulated a clear vision of the lack of personal
liability for official conduct:
[T]he acts of a man in the character of a public agent are not his
own; he represents his Government; and if he conducts [himself] so
as to excite the complaints of the citizens of another State, or of this
State, justice should not be required of him, but of the Government
from whom he holds the authority in virtue of which he has done
the act complained of.14 2
Adet also outlined a vision of diplomatic protection by the injured
party's government as the best-and only-recourse for individuals
allegedly harmed by the public acts of another state's officials:
It is [the official's] Government alone that is to judge whether the
orders it has given have been well executed or not, and to approve
or punish its agent, accused of an improper act towards neutral or
allied nations, and to make such reparations as it deems just and
equitable. Therefore the party complaining should lay their complaints before it, either directly, or through the medium of its own
Government. Were it otherwise, one Government would become
amenable to another; which would reverse the first principles of the
rights of nations. 143
Adet argued that injuries caused to one country's citizens by another
country's officials are matters for diplomatic, not judicial,
resolution-the opposite of Attorney General Bradford and crown
advocate Scott's disavowal of the executive branch's ability to interfere in a privately initiated suit.144
Adet complained to Randolph that this was not the first time
American courts had "arrogate[d] to themselves the cognizance of the
conduct of French agents," and he pointed to Waters v. Collot as an
example. 145 He argued that detaining Captain Davis violated the
United States's obligations under its 1778 Treaty of Amity and
French Republic [July 11, 1795]) in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 136, at 631,
631 (indicating the bail arrangement).
141 Letter from P.A. Adet to Mr. Randolph (Aug. 9, 1795), supra note 140.
142 Id. at 629.
143 Id.
144 See supra notes 123-24 & 130 and accompanying text (disclaiming the ability of the
Executive to intervene).
145 Letter from P.A. Adet to Mr. Randolph (Aug. 9, 1795), supra note 140, at 630.
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Commerce with France, which provided that each country would
punish any violations by its own "men of war," and that each would
give safe harbor to the other's public and private ships.146
Secretary Randolph consulted the U.S. Attorney for the District
of Pennsylvania, William Rawle. Rawle advised Randolph that the
district court's order attaching the Cassius was impermissible, because
it amounted to an indirect attempt to make France itself amenable to
a U.S. tribunal. 147 Rawle also thought that Davis should not be "liable
to prosecution" under a 1794 criminal statute designed to punish
offenses against the United States, but not because the proceedings
against Davis would implead France. Rather, he opined that Davis's
capture of the William Lindsey did not come within the statute's
express language because Davis had not accepted his commission
from France "within" the United States. 148
Peter Stephen DuPonceau assisted France with legal representation in the Cassius affair, which quickly became a major irritant in
relations between France and the United States. 149 Secretary
Randolph reported to Minister Adet that attorney DuPonceau was
filing a motion with the district court for the discharge of the Cassius,
and that DuPonceau also planned to move the U.S. Supreme Court
for a prohibition to enjoin the district court from proceeding in the
case.1 s0 Randolph promised Adet that he would keep informed of the
situation, but he emphasized that "as long as the question is in the
hands of our courts, the Executive cannot withdraw it from them."1 51
Id. at 629-30.
See Statement of W. Rawle (Dec. 21, 1796), supra note 136, at 637 (opining on the
lawfulness of attaching the Cassius).
148 Id. (referring to Act of June 5, 1794, ch. L, 1 Stat. 381, which made it a crime for a
U.S. citizen to "accept and exercise" a foreign commission "within the territory or jurisdiction" of the United States).
149 In Yard v. Davis, the same lawyers who litigated Waters v. Collot found their positions reversed. DuPonceau, who had argued that Collot was suable in a U.S. court, now
insisted that Davis's arrest was just as offensive to French sovereignty as the attachment of
the Cassius itself. Lewis, who had represented Collot, argued that the district court had
jurisdiction over both Davis and the Cassius. See supra text accompanying note 65 (identifying attorneys in Waters v. Collot). DuPonceau made a career of representing French
interests, which makes his representation of Waters in the suit against Collot somewhat
puzzling. However, at the time of that suit, DuPonceau had recently founded the French
Benevolent Society of Philadelphia together with the Kitty's owner Stephen Girard, a
fellow French expatriate. This relationship could explain the unusual representation in
Collot.
150 Letter from Edmund Randolph, Dep't of State, to Mr. Adet, Minister
Plenipotentiary of the French Republic (Aug. 1[4], 1795), in 8 DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra
note 48, at 373-74; see also 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 731 (indicating
that the letter was actually written on August 14).
151 Letter from Edmund Randolph to Mr. Adet (Aug. 1[4], 1795), supra note 150, at
373-74.
146
147
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Randolph also wrote a follow-up letter to Adet indicating that he had
asked U.S. Attorney Rawle to "bring forward an application to the
Judge" to determine promptly whether the Cassius itself "[was] liable
or not to his jurisdiction."1 5 2
Rawle and DuPonceau met to discuss the best way to proceed in
the midst of this diplomatic wrangling.153 They recognized that, even if
the district court found in France's favor, it would not discharge the
Cassius if the plaintiffs filed an appeal, which could take eight or nine
months to resolve. Minister Adet would not agree to pay a bond to
secure the Cassius's release, and Secretary Randolph would not volunteer to pay a bond in France's stead.154 Both countries were
steadfast in their positions. So, too, were the parties, as settlement
talks with Plaintiff Yard apparently failed.' 55 Meanwhile, eighteen
crew members from the Cassius deserted, and unknown persons committed thefts on board the docked ship.156
Rawle pondered how to inform the district court of his view that
it lacked jurisdiction over the Cassius, even if it had personal jurisdiction over Captain Davis. Calling his submission a "[s]uggestion," 157
Rawle made an appearance in order to state his position that the
Cassius "so being the property of, and belonging to, the French
Republic, cannot, by law, be rendered liable to civil process in the
courts of the United States, at the suit of individuals."1 58 During the
hearing, Rawle indicated that he was only charged with defending the
ship itself, and not Captain Davis.159 Later, in a letter to Minister
152 Letter from Edmund Randolph, Dep't of State, to Mr. Adet, Minister
Plenipotentiary of the French Republic (Aug. 15, 1795), in 8 DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra
note 48, at 375.
153 Letter from Peter Stephen DuPonceau to Pierre-Auguste Adet (Aug. 16, 1795),
Peter Stephen DuPonceau Letterbook B (1792-1797) at 129, Historical Soc'y of Pa. (manuscript copy on file with the New York University Law Review), reprinted in 6
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 731, 731.
154 Id. at 731-32.
155 Statement of W. Rawle (Dec. 21, 1796), supra note 136, at 637.
156 Letter from P.A. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French republic, to Mr.
Randolph, Sec'y of State of the U.S. (Aug. 18, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 136, at 631.
157 Suggestion of the Attorney of the United States for the Pennsylvania District, and
the Plea of Samuel B. Davis to the Jurisdiction of the District Court for the Said District, in
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 136, at 639 [hereinafter Suggestion and Plea].
Samuel Davis's submission to the Supreme Court, upon which the motion for a prohibition
was founded, was also termed a "suggestion." See United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.)
121, 122-25 (1795) (reproducing the suggestion filed by attorney Benjamin R. Morgan on
Davis's behalf in the district court).
158 Suggestion and Plea, supra note 157.
159 Letter from Peter Stephen DuPonceau to Pierre-Auguste Adet (Aug. 19, 1795),
Peter Stephen DuPonceau Letterbook B (1792-1797) at 132, Historical Soc'y of Pa. (manuscript copy on file with the New York University Law Review), reprinted in 6
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Adet, attorney DuPonceau objected to Rawle's distinction between
the ship and the captain because, in his opinion, the attachment and
the arrest violated the same principle. 160
Adet felt strongly that the Executive should seek an injunction
from the Supreme Court against the district court proceedings,161 but
time was of the essence because there were only a few days remaining
in the Court's term before a six-month recess.162 Adet would have to
settle for Davis's lawyers taking this step on their own. On August 21,
1795, Davis simultaneously filed a plea to the district court asking to
be discharged from arrest and for a writ of prohibition from the
Supreme Court to enjoin the district court proceedings. 63
By this time, Alexander Dallas had joined DuPonceau and Jared
Ingersoll as counsel for Captain Davis. Dallas argued to the Supreme
Court that "[tihe Cassius being then the property of a sovereign and
independent nation, cannot be attached for any supposed delinquency
of her commander, committed on the high seas: it would be making
public property responsible for private wrongs." M Dallas also argued
that the French court at Port de Paix (the court of the captor) had
exclusive jurisdiction over the prize case between the Cassius and the
William Lindsey, and consequently over Yard's claim for damages.1 6 5
He continued:
[The libel in the district court is] for damages, in consequence of the
capture as prize, which can only be given by the court having cognizance of that question. Any other interpretation of the law would be
attended with intolerable inconveniences. Every owner, freighter,
master, seaman, of a vessel taken as prize, might sue the Captor in
every Court of every Country. No precedent of such a proceeding
exists; and the universal silence on this subject, amounts to a denial
of its legality.166
Dallas relied on the principle that, under "the law of nations, the right
of judging is vested in the courts of the captor," 167 meaning that all
supra note 38, at 733, 733. The printed reproduction of Rawle's
suggestion also includes Davis's own submission to the court, in which he denied the
court's jurisdiction and referred to a certificate from Adet indicating that he was commissioned as an officer of the French navy. Suggestion and Plea, supra note 157.
160 Letter from Peter Stephen DuPonceau to Pierre-August Adet (Aug. 19, 1795), supra
note 159.
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,

161 Id.

162 Id.
163

164
165
166
167

Statement of W. Rawle (Dec. 21, 1796), supra note 136.
United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121, 127 (1795).
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 126.
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claims relating to the Cassius's capture of the William Lindsey could
only be adjudicated by French courts.
William Lewis and his co-counsel Tilghman opposed Captain
Davis's motion to enjoin the district court proceedings.168 Perhaps
because Alexander Dallas represented Davis, his report of the case
gave short shrift to Lewis and Tilghman's arguments in favor of the
district court's jurisdiction. 1 6 9 On August 24, 1795, Chief Justice John
Rutledge announced that "though a difference of sentiment exists, a
majority of the Court are [sic] clearly of the opinion, that the motion
[for a prohibition] ought to be granted."170
The Supreme Court's order indicated that, in the context of this
prize case, "vessels of war, their commanders, officers and crews, are
not amenable before the tribunals of neutral powers for their conduct
therein, but are only answerable to the sovereign in whose immediate
service they were, and from whom they derived their authority."171
Adet had provided Captain Davis with a certificate indicating that
Davis was duly commissioned by France "to cruize [sic] against her
enemies, and make prize of their ships."1 72 The Supreme Court held
that, because the William Lindsey was not captured in U.S. waters, the
district court could not adjudicate prize claims against either the
Cassius or Davis.173
Although the district court was barred from proceeding, Plaintiff
Yard was undeterred. No sooner had the Supreme Court issued its
prohibition than one of Yard's associates, John Ketland, filed a qui
tam action in the Philadelphia circuit court, again seeking to attach
the Cassius. Ketland claimed that the Cassius, previously named Les
Jumeaux, had been armed in the Philadelphia port in violation of the
neutrality law of June 5, 1794, and that the circuit court had jurisdiction on that basis. 174 Adet suspected that Ketland filed this qui tam
168 See 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 722 n.17 (indicating that Lewis's

co-counsel could have been either William or Edward Tilghman).
169 Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 129.
170 Id.

171 Id. at 130.

172 Id. The Pennsylvania circuit court later deemed such official certificates inadequate
proof of the "property of the Cassius" itself. Letter from Timothy Pickering, Sec'y of State,
to Mr. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French republic (June 3, 1796), in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 136, at 636.
173 Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 136.

174 Ketland v. The Cassius, 14 F. Cas. 431 (C.C.D. Pa. 1796). For more on the Cassius
affair from the perspective of enforcing neutrality laws, see 7 CORRESPONDENCE
CONCERNING CLAIMS AGAINST GREAT BRITAIN 18-23 (1871). The Cassius, previously
named Les Jumeaux, had in fact been fitted out illegally in Philadelphia, leading to the trial
of Etienne Guinet-the first prosecution under the 1794 Neutrality Act. The Neutrality
Act was designed to keep the United States from becoming entangled in the ongoing conflict between England and France by enabling U.S. courts to prosecute individuals for
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action solely to create delay, because the circuit court only sat two
times a year. 7 5
The qui tam action inched forward without any further claims
against Captain Davis, because it was solely a claim against the ship.
Meanwhile, the newly-appointed Secretary of State, Timothy
Pickering, wondered whether the United States had any obligation to
prosecute Davis. It was becoming increasingly apparent that Davis
had been involved in, or at least aware of, the unlawful arming of Les
Jumeaux in Philadelphia and that he had deliberately waited until the
ship was outside of U.S. waters before taking command as its captain.
Pickering asked U.S. Attorney Rawle: "As the captain (Davis) was,
and probably remains, a citizen of the United States, is it not the duty
of the government to commence a prosecution against him?" 17 6 He
later pressed Rawle further:
Shall any of our piratical citizens be allowed to run out of our
harbors, a league from the land, and there receive commissions
from the agents of one of the belligerent powers, and then return to
our ports and exercise them with impunity? [B]ecause he did not
accept as well as exercise his commission within our jurisdiction, is
Captain Davis innocent?' 77
Pickering found himself caught between Minister Adet, who
remained furious about the ongoing qui tam proceedings against the
Cassius, and the British charg6 d'affaires, Phineas Bond (British
Minister George Hammond's interim replacement), who insisted that
the United States punish Davis for his complicity in the arming of the
Cassius in the Philadelphia port.
actions that undermined the United States's neutrality. See FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE
TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES 93-94 (1849); see also CHARLES WARREN, History and
Scope of Section 9 of the Federal Penal Code, in HISTORY OF LAWS PROHIBITING
CORRESPONDENCE WITH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AND ACCEPTANCE OF A COMMISSION,

S. Doc. No. 696, at 15 (2d Sess. 1917) (providing an account of the drafting and enactment
of this legislation).
175 Letter from P.A. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French republic, to Mr.
Pickering, Sec'y of Dep't of War (Sept. 22, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 136, at 632, 633.
176 Letter from Timothy Pickering to William Rawle, Dist. Att'y, Pa. (Sept. 1, 1795), in 8
DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra note 48, at 384, 384-85.
177 Letter from Timothy Pickering to William Rawle, Dist. Att'y, Pa. (Sept. 7, 1795), in 8
DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra note 48, at 397, 397-98. This is precisely the distinction that led
Rawle to advise Randolph that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Davis in the
first place. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (opining on the lack of statutory
jurisdiction over Davis). Pickering repeated his skepticism of this distinction in a subsequent letter to Rawle. See Letter from Timothy Pickering to William Rawle (Oct. 1, 1795)
(on file with the New York University Law Review) (challenging Rawle's interpretation of
the statute).
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In response to Adet's continued protests about the second suit
against the Cassius, Pickering wrote that "Mr. Randolph has already
informed you 'that, as long as the question is in the hands of our
courts, the Executive cannot withdraw it from them."s 78 Two months
later, Pickering repeated:
If the Executive were to attempt (and it could only attempt-for it
would be the duty of the court to resist its mandate) to remove the
question from the judiciary, it would be a violation of the
[C]onstitution: and you will see immediately that the measure
would be as unsafe as unconstitutional.' 7 9
Pickering also informed Adet that he was now certain that the Cassius
had been armed in the port of Philadelphia and had deliberately
evaded arrest by the U.S. authorities while en route to the West
Indies.o80 He shared his suspicion that Davis "went out in her ostensibly as a passenger, and . .. consequently was on board of her when

the laws of the United States were forcibly resisted,"' 8 ' thereby giving
a U.S. court jurisdiction over Davis's actions, even under Adet's criteria. Based on these new facts, Pickering intimated that France might
not have an exclusive claim to adjudicate the lawfulness of Davis's
capture of the William Lindsey.
Adet was not placated. In a report to the French Foreign
Relations Committee, he complained that Yard had impermissibly
brought the original suit against Davis in the district court for
"un Acte par lui commis, non comme particulier, mais comme
Commandant" (an act committed by him, not as an individual, but as
the Captain) of the Cassius.182 He accused British chargg d'affaires
Bond of being the driving force behind the second suit against the
ship, which had been filed by Bond's "friend and agent" Ketland.183
Bond, for his part, had an interest in keeping the Cassius detained for
as long as possible, both to incapacitate it and to send a strong message about the consequences of arming French ships in U.S. ports.184
178 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French
republic (Aug. 25, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 136, at 631.
179 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French
republic (Oct. 1, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra note 136, at 634.
180 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Adet (Aug. 25, 1795), supra note 178, at 631
(citing Report of David Robinett (Dec. 31, 1794), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, supra
note 136, at 632).
181 Id.
182 Letter from P.A. Adet, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, to Comm'n
on Foreign Relations (Sept. 30, 1795), in CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 40, at 780

(author's translation).
183 Id.
184 As David Sloss documents, the British used litigation as "lawfare" during this period

by forcing French privateers to defend admiralty actions in U.S. courts, thereby
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He urged Pickering to prosecute Davis, but Pickering responded that
there did not appear to be sufficient evidence to bring criminal
charges. 85 While this back-and-forth continued, Davis kept a low profile, surfacing only to sign a pleading in the circuit court-an affidavit
drafted by attorney DuPonceau that affirmed Davis's status as "a
Lieutenant in the navy of the French Republic" and documented
damage to the Cassius caused by its prolonged detention in the
Philadelphia port.186 Davis then disappeared; when Yard filed yet
another suit against him in the district court, Davis could not be
found.18 7
Like the other cases explored in this Article, Yard v. Davis illustrates the diplomatic dance occasioned by litigation involving a foreign sovereign's property or the conduct of its officials. The Cassius
affair confirms the U.S. Executive's consistent disavowal of the power
to stop private civil proceedings against a nondiplomatic official. But
it also shows a step toward more direct involvement, in the form of
William Rawle's "[s]uggestion" that applicable law precluded a
French public ship from "be[ing] rendered liable to civil process in the
courts of the United States."188 This early "suggestion" of immunity
for the ship was not accompanied by a similar suggestion of immunity
for its captain, despite France's request.
As the Cassius literally rotted in port, prevailing understandings
about foreign official immunity continued to crystallize: first, that U.S.
courts could compel nondiplomatic officials to respond to civil suits
even if they claimed that their actions had been authorized by a foreign government; and second, that the Executive lacked power to
order the dismissal of a civil suit against a nondiplomatic official, even
though the Executive would maintain an active interest in litigation
that gave rise to diplomatic protests.
D.

Dunant v. Perroud

The potential for litigation to trigger diplomatic protests means
that, as a practical matter, diplomatic correspondence can provide
"detain[ing] the privateers' property for extended periods of time and ma[king] it difficult
for privateers to initiate additional attacks on enemy merchant vessels." Sloss, supra note
18, at 174.
185 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Bond, Charg6 des aff. of his Brit. majesty
(Sept. 3, 1795), in 8 DOMESTIC LETTERS, supra note 48, at 387.
186 Affidavit of Samuel B. Davis (Sept. 4, 1795) (on file with the New York University
Law Review).
187 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 725 & n.32 (citing Writ of Attachment
and Arrest, Sept. 29, 1795, Yard v. Schooner William Lindsay).
188 Suggestion and Plea, supra note 157.
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valuable clues about lawsuits for which official court records do not
appear to have survived. This is true for Dunant v. Perroud.
History has not been kind to Henry Perroud. Perroud was
appointed "ordonnateur" of the French colony of St. Domingo by the
Governor, General ttienne Laveaux, "for the purpose of organizing a
more perfect system of finance." 18 9 One surviving account dismisses
him as "the insignificant Perroud," while noting that he escaped the
turmoil in St. Domingo in 1796 by fleeing to the United States. 190 If
Perroud had known about the civil suits brought against Collot,
Cochrane, and Davis, perhaps he would have sought refuge
elsewhere.
Upon Perroud's arrival in the United States, Philadelphia
merchant Edward Dunant initiated a suit against him for acts performed in St. Domingo while Perroud was Ordonnateur. On
September 17, 1796, the Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court issued a writ of capias authorizing Perroud's arrest.191 Sheriff
John Baker indicated that a bail bond was executed for $60,000 on
November 10, 1796,192 and that Chief Justice Thomas McKean subsequently discharged Perroud on common bail (a promise to appear). 193
This likely means that Perroud filed a successful motion to show cause
why he should not be discharged on common bail, just as Attorney
General Bradford had advised Collot to do in similar circumstances.
The case was discontinued on June 29, 1798.194
The litigation was conducted by a familiar cast of characters.
Attorney William Lewis represented the plaintiff, Dunant.195 The
French Republic engaged Peter Stephen DuPonceau to represent
Perroud.196 Secretary of State Pickering referred to the suit in passing
in a May 29, 1797 letter to French consul-general Philippe IUtombe,
189 C.W. MOSSELL, TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE, THE HERO OF SAlNr DOMINGO 106
(1896). The title "ordonnateur" means that Perroud was a high-level bureaucrat.
190 TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE ET L'INDPPENDANCE D'HArTI 88 (Jacques de Cauna ed.,
2004).
191 Writ of Capias and Bail Bond, Sept. 17, 1796, Pa. State Archives, RG-33, Records of
the Sup. Ct. of Pa., E. Dist., Capias Papers, series #33.24 (Dec. 1796) (on file with the New
York University Law Review).
192 Id.; see also Docket Entry 177, December Term 1796, Pa. State Archives, RG-33,
Records of the Sup. Ct. of Pa., E. Dist., Appearance Dockets, series #33.12 (Dec. Term
1795-March Term 1797) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (recording the
bail).
193 Id.
194 Discontinuance, June 29, 1798, Pa. State Archives, RG-33, Records of the Sup. Ct. of
Pa., E. Dist., Discontinuance Papers, series #33.38 (Dec. 1796) (on file with the New York
University Law Review).
195 Id. (filed by Mr. Lewis).
196 DuPonceau issued an invoice "for services rendered to the French Republic."
M6moire des honoraires das AP.S. DuPonceau (Jan. 20, 1797), Peter Stephen DuPonceau
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during their correspondence about the ongoing proceedings against
General Collot. In the letter, Pickering informed Ltombe that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court had "discharged Mr. Peroud [sic], the
Ordonnateur at Cape Francois" upon a showing that "his act which
occasioned the injury complained of had been within his lawful
powers." 19 7 In Pickering's view, it was in part Collot's persistent
refusal to make such a showing that had prolonged the proceedings
against him. 198 Pickering invoked Perroud as an example to show that
lawful authority could be invoked successfully to secure a defendant's
discharge on common bail.
No additional court records appear to have survived in Dunant v.
Perroud.199 Still, some clues exist. It is possible that the claim against
Perroud involved the Martha, a sloop owned by Edward Dunant. 200
On March 23, 1795, the Martha entered the harbor at Port APaix in St.
Domingo. 201 The Governor, General Laveaux, attempted to commandeer the Martha's cargo of flour, insisting that the 630 barrels should
be delivered to the administration for the use of the French
Republic. 202 When the ship's master, Joshua McWilliams, refused the
price offered by Laveaux, he was denied permission to leave the port
and was told "that Gen. Lavaud [sic] had ordered his sails and rudder
to be taken away if he did not comply." 203 McWilliams ultimately
capitulated and agreed to sell the flour, which would otherwise have
spoiled, to Perroud, the agent for the French administration. 204 If the
Martha incident was in fact the basis for Dunant's 1796 suit against
Perroud in Philadelphia, it makes sense that Perroud would not
have been personally liable. Because Perroud acted solely as the

Letterbook (1792-1797) at 250, Historical Soc'y of Pa. (on file with the New York
University Law Review).
197 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Letombe (May 29, 1797), supra note 100, at
51-52.
198 See supra note 103 and accompanying text (blaming the delay on Collot's refusal to
say anything other than that he had been Governor at the time of the alleged acts).
199 1 discovered the above-referenced court records only after repeated searches of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court archives for cases involving "Peroud" or "Perroud" as a
party.
200 An account of an incident involving the Martha.appears in records from a case
brought in 1892 in the U.S. Court of Claims by John C. Williams, administrator of Edward
Dunant. Williams v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 218 (1892); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 41,

at 398-99 (detailing losses to the Martha).
201 Williams, 27 Ct. Cl. at 218.
202 Id. at 218-19.
203 Id. at 219.
204 Id.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

740

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:704

commercial agent of France, the government alone would have borne
financial responsibility for the resulting loss. 2 0 5
Despite the dearth of information about the Perroudcase, it adds
to the cluster of civil suits against foreign officials in the 1790s in
which legally relevant actors articulated and acted upon prevailing
understandings of cognizable claims and defenses. These actors also
further explored the boundaries of executive and judicial authority.
The cases manifest at least three identifiable patterns. First, merely
claiming an official (but nondiplomatic) title was insufficient to secure
a defendant's discharge-some further proof or evidence that the
challenged conduct was within the defendant's "lawful powers" was
required. 206 Second, following basic principles of agency law, an individual who had been acting merely as the commercial agent of a foreign country was not personally liable, although this did not prevent
such an individual from being arrested and compelled to enter a
defensive plea. Third, a tension remained between the courts' insistence that the defendant show his action to be within the scope of
official authority to secure dismissal of a suit, and foreign countries'
claims that their own courts should determine whether their own officials had exceeded such authority.
E. Parnell & Stewart v. Sinclair
Like the suit against Perroud, many of the clues about the suit
against Henry Sinclair come from diplomatic correspondence, buttressed by an Attorney General opinion and contemporary news
reports. Sinclair was a privateer rather than a government official, but
he was acting under a commission from the British government. He
claimed that this official commission shielded him from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. Courts and scholars have referenced Sinclair's case
but neglected to explore it in any detail. The underlying facts have all
but been forgotten.
As the United States struggled to maintain its neutrality,
American ships became entangled in the conflict between England
and France. A letter of marque from King George III commissioned
205 The suit could also have been related to Laveaux's requisitioning other items from
ships owned by Dunant, such as the George on May 18, 1795, the Hope on June 3, 1795, or
the Liberty on June 9, 1795. See WILLIAMS, supra note 41, at 159 (losses incurred by the
brig George); id. at 186 (articles requisitioned from the Hope at Cape Francois on June 3,
1795); id. at 217 (removal of articles from the Liberty and the George on June 9, 1795).
206 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing Perroud's discharge upon a
showing that "his act which occasioned the injury complained of had been within his lawful
powers").
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Henry Sinclair to "cruise" against enemy ships. 2 0 7 Sinclair, captain of
the Swinger, captured the Atlantic, an American ship, while it was en
route from a French port in the West Indies back to its home port of
Baltimore, on the suspicion that it was carrying enemy (Spanish)
property. 208 John Parnell and David Stewart, the Atlantic's owners,
brought a civil suit for damages against Captain Sinclair.209
On December 1, 1797, the Alexandria Advertiser reported that
"Henry Sinclair, captain of the British letter of marque Swinger, now
in this port, was arrested, and imprisoned in the county gaol, on suits
for damages amounting to 20,000 dollars, brought against him by
Stewart and Son, of Baltimore[ ]."1210 After the Advertiser reported
Sinclair's arrest, a subscriber sent a letter to the editor providing a
version of the events according to Henry Stockett, Captain of the
Atlantic.211The letter indicated that, after the Swinger had captured it,
two different ships successively re-captured the Atlantic, and it
endured a series of further misfortunes at sea. 212
Parnell and Stewart sued Captain Sinclair in Alexandria for damages relating to his alleged theft of articles from the Atlantic and the
Atlantic's subsequent misadventures. 213 The letter to the editor of the
Advertiser recounted that Parnell and Stewart, having found Sinclair
"in this port, have sued him for damages, and he is now in confinement, having as yet been unable to find bail." 214
Captain Sinclair was thoroughly distraught by his arrest. He
wrote a lengthy and detailed plea to Robert Liston, the British
Minister to the United States. 215 Sinclair's unpublished memorial
offers a window into the human story behind privateering, civil suits,
and the expectations of individuals about the legal regimes that
govern their conduct. Because Sinclair was acting under a British commission, he had an expectation of protection by the British authorities.
207 Letter from R. Liston to Colonel Pickering, Sec'y of State (Dec. 15, 1797),
microformed on M50, Roll 3 (NARA Microfilm Publ'n) (on file with the New York
University Law Review).
208 Memorial of Henry Sinclair, from Henry Sinclair to Robert Liston, His Britannick
Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States (Dec. 6, 1797), microformed on
M50, Roll 3 (NARA Microfilm Publ'n) (on file with the New York University Law
Review).
209 Id.

210 Alexandria Advertiser, Dec. 1, 1797, at 3. The Swinger apparently had arrived at
Alexandria on November 19. FederalGazette & BaltimoreDaily Advertiser, Nov. 22, 1797,
at 3.
211 Alexandria Advertiser, Dec. 2, 1797, at 3.
212 Id.

213 Alexandria Advertiser, Dec. 1, 1797, at 3; Alexandria Advertiser, Dec. 2, 1797, at 3.
214 Alexandria Advertiser, Dec. 2, 1797, at 3.
215 Memorial of Henry Sinclair, supra note 208.
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However, he was not a diplomatic official. Thus, his presence within
the United States subjected him to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, with
the attendant delays and potential harm to his privateering business,
even if he were ultimately found to have acted lawfully.
In his memorial, Sinclair reported that he had been "confined in
Gaole" for some time but had finally been able to give bail to
guarantee his appearance in court "at March term next." 216 He
explained that the Swinger had encountered the Atlantic on March 17,
and that he "had every reason to believe that part of the Cargo was
Spanish Property," and thus subject to confiscation as a prize.217 He
conceded that, after the Atlantic had been recaptured by the two
other ships, a court at St. Kitts "cleared" the ship and cargo rather
than condemning it. But he maintained the validity of his initial capture, and he blamed a French privateer for destroying the "[1]etters
and [p]apers" that would have substantiated his original suspicion that
the Atlantic was carrying Spanish cargo. 218 Sinclair sheepishly
acknowledged that he had taken some goods from the Atlantic when
he boarded it, but he insisted that this was due to "Your Memorialist
being in want of [b]read," and that he had assured Captain Stockett at
the time "that he would receive payment from the Owner of the
Swinger in Barbadoes, if no Condemnation took place." 219
Most urgently, Sinclair feared for his livelihood. He complained
to Liston that his arrest and trial would prevent him from commanding the Swinger and pursuing "his customary occupation,"
thereby reducing him "to entire ruin, unless he is relieved by the
Interposition of His Britannick Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary." 2 2 0
In Sinclair's view, such interposition was warranted because he had
acted while bound by "the Oath administered to him by his
Country." 221 It therefore followed that:
If he has done wrong in sending the Ship Atlantic for adjudication,

and if his alterning [sic] her Route has been the cause of her subsequent misfortunes, Your Memorialist humbly conceives that he is
not amenable to the Laws of the United States, but to those of his
own Country, from whence he received his Commission and where,
216 Id. Bail was given by James Patton, the British Vice-Consul at Alexandria. Letter
from Robert Liston to Lord [Grenville] (Feb. 6, 1798), available at British National
Archives, F.O. 5/22 at 94-95 (on file with the New York University Law Review).
217 Memorial of Henry Sinclair, supra note 208.
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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previous to its being delivered to him, ample Security was deposited
for its faithful Discharge. 222
On December 15, 1797, Liston transmitted Sinclair's memorial to
Secretary of State Pickering. 223 Liston argued that "if [Sinclair] was
guilty of any irregularity in the Seizure [of the Atlantic], he might have
been punished by the British Court of Admiralty to which the trial
was submitted, since he had previously given the requisite Security for
his good behavior." 224 Liston therefore insisted that Sinclair "was not
amenable in this instance to the Courts of Law of the United
States." 225 He also argued that, because Sinclair was not "amenable"
to U.S. courts, "his late imprisonment was consequently illegal," and
he ought to be released from the obligation to give bail.226 Pickering
forwarded Liston's letter and Sinclair's memorial to Attorney General
Charles Lee and asked Lee to opine whether Sinclair was entitled to
"an exemption from all responsibility in the case to the laws of any
other country than his own." 227
Like his predecessor Bradford, Lee argued that Sinclair "ought to
prevail" at trial before the court of law at Alexandria, because "it is as
well settled in the United States as in Great Britain, that a person
acting under a commission from the sovereign of a foreign nation is
not amenable for what he does in pursuance of his commission, to any
judiciary tribunal in the United States."122 8 However, also like
Bradford, Lee disclaimed any power of the Executive to intervene,
based upon the same principle "that has been settled in the case of
General Collot, and I believe in some other cases." 229 This principle
dictated that "the Executive cannot interpose with the judiciary proceedings between an individual and Henry Sinclair, whose controversy
is entitled to a trial according to law." 230
The problem for Sinclair was that he could not wait for a March
hearing to defend himself in court. As a privateer, his livelihood
depended on his ability to return promptly to sea. Mindful of this time
pressure, Liston went on the offensive. He interpreted the letters from
Pickering and Lee as "agree[ing] in the opinion that the detention of
Id.
223 Letter from R. Liston to Colonel Pickering (Dec. 15, 1797), supra note 207.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles [Lee], Att'y Gen. (Dec. 23, 1797), in 10
222

DOMESTIc LETrERS, supra note 48, at 276.

228 Actions Against Foreigners, Case of Sinclair, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 81, 81 (1797).
229 Id. These "other cases" likely included those of Alexander Cochrane and Henry
Perroud.
230 Id.
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Mr. Sinclair was illegal." 2 31 He therefore instructed the British ViceConsul at Alexandria, James Patton, to bring an action of damages for
false imprisonment against the plaintiffs, David Stewart and John
Parnell. 232
The suit for false imprisonment never got off the ground.
Although Liston later expressed "little doubt that Mr. Sinclair would
have recovered a compensation for the imprisonment he had suffered," he reported to British Foreign Secretary William Grenville
that Sinclair elected to "compromis[e] matters with the adverse party"
because he had "in fact carried off certain articles from the American
Ship, before she was brought into port for trial." 233 Sinclair's awareness of his own misconduct led him to settle the lawsuit rather than
pursue a claim for false imprisonment. The threat of damages for false
imprisonment also may have led Parnell and Stewart to accept a
settlement rather than go to trial.
There is also an intriguing, although unconfirmed, hint of executive involvement behind the scenes. Liston reported to Grenville that
Pickering "wrote ... to the Magistrates before whom the trial was to
have come on" about the illegality of Sinclair's arrest, 234 although no
such letter appears in official State Department records or among
Pickering's papers. Given Lee's public insistence on the Executive's
powerlessness to intervene in judicial proceedings, it would have been
curious for Pickering to have written such a letter, although it is conceivable that he attempted to exercise some behind-the-scenes influence over events. Liston also may have mistakenly conveyed an overly
optimistic understanding of Pickering's reassurances. No court records
appear to have survived, leaving the remaining details to
speculation. 235
Letter from Robert Liston to Lord [Grenville] (Feb. 6, 1798), supra note 216.
Id.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 See E-mail from George K. Combs, Branch Manager, Special Collections,
Alexandria Library, to author (June 30, 2010, 15:51) (on file with the New York University
Law Review); E-mail from George K. Combs, Branch Manager, Special Collections,
Alexandria Library, to Vincent Moyer (June 18, 2010, 14:25) (on file with the New York
University Law Review); E-mail from Katrina R. Krempasky, Fairfax Circuit Court
Historical Records, to author (Nov. 22, 2010, 06:16) (on file with the New York University
Law Review); E-mail from Elaine McHale, Librarian, Virginia Room, Fairfax Cnty. Pub.
Library, to author (Dec. 7, 2010, 17:20) (on file with the New York University Law
Review). Additional records searched include Fairfax County Court Records, Minute
Book, 1797-1798, and U.S. District Court and Circuit Court cases. E-mail from Minor
Weisiger, Archives Reference Servs. Coordinator, Library of Va., to author (July 20, 2011,
11:45) (on file with the New York University Law Review); E-mail from Katrina R.
Krempasky, Fairfax Circuit Court Historical Records, to author, supra.
231

232
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Because Parnell and Stewart settled their claims against Captain
Sinclair before trial, just as Captain Waters ultimately abandoned his
claim against Collot, there remains little historical record of the proof
required to discharge a defendant on conduct-based immunity
grounds. At a minimum, where the plaintiff seemed to be attempting
to circumvent the exclusive jurisdiction of a foreign admiralty court by
bringing a civil claim relating to the capture of a ship as a prize, the
Executive was not supportive, even though it was the judiciary's
responsibility to identify and dismiss such suits.
F. Jones v. L6tombe
The final eighteenth-century suit examined here was brought
against a French official living in the United States. French consulgeneral Philippe L6tombe was no stranger to suits against French officials. He had corresponded with Secretary of State Pickering about
the case against Victor Collot and had given bail for Samuel Davis. 2 3 6
In November 1797, L6tombe found himself in the defendants' shoes.
L6tombe had previously signed several bills of exchange directing the
French minister of the marine in Paris to pay more than $70,000 to
James Swan, a financier who had been the official purchasing agent of
the French Government in the United States. 237 Swan endorsed the
bills over to John Coffin Jones of Massachusetts. When the French
minister failed to pay the bills, Jones sued L6tombe under the original
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. 238
L6tombe promptly objected to the suit. In response, Attorney
General Lee advised Pickering that L6tombe was "not privileged from
legal process, either by the general law of nations, or by the consular
convention between the United States and France," 239 because he was
not a diplomatic official. According to Lee, whether or not L6tombe
could be found personally responsible for the debts of the French
Republic did not affect his "suability." 2 4 0 Moreover, although Lee
opined that Ldtombe had been acting merely "as the commercial
agent of the [French] republic," he repeated that "the President of the
United States has no constitutional right to interpose his authority,
but must leave the matter to the tribunals of justice." 24 1 L6tombe
236 Letter from [Joseph Ltombe] to P.A. Adet (July 11, 1795), supra note 140 (indicating the bail arrangement).
237 See 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 75 (describing this transaction).
238 Id. Because this case was brought under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, a fuller account of the litigation can be found in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 38, at 75-79.
239 Consular Privileges, Case of Ltombe, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 77, 77-78 (1797).
240 Id. at 78.
241

Id.
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could not claim immunity from arrest and was forced to give $90,000
bail. 242
In a report to French Foreign Minister Talleyrand, L6tombe indicated that, after giving bail, he consulted several ministers residing in
the United States, all of whom indicated that "a consul is not subject
to the laws of the 'country in which he resides for any transaction he
undertakes in his capacity and under the direct authority of his sovereign.' "243 He stated that he was still awaiting a response to a letter he
had sent Pickering, and that the legal team of DuPonceau, Dallas, and
Edward Livingston was representing him. In their view, he explained:
I cannot . . . reject the [jurisdiction of the] Supreme Court of the
United States rationepersonae but rather ratione materiae because

if, on the one hand, article II of the consular convention subjects
French consuls to the territorial laws on an equal footing with U.S.
nationals, on the other hand, it seems impossible to them that I
could be judged in the United States as being personally responsible
for transactions performed in my official capacity and under the
direct authority of my Government. 244
On December 2, 1797, L6tombe updated Talleyrand and informed
him that, although Attorney General Lee had offered a favorable
assessment of his lack of personal liability for France's debts, he would
nevertheless be required to subject himself to the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. 245
The case against L6tombe further illustrates the extent to which
the Executive went out of its way to disavow the constitutional
authority to interfere with civil proceedings. Secretary Pickering wrote
to L6tombe:
Having, as you inform me, resided seventeen years in the United
States, you must have become acquainted with their Constitution,
which separates the various powers of Government: marks the
limits of each, & forbids one to interfere in the department of
another; especially you must have known that the executive branch
of Government cannot controul [sic] the Judicial branch without a
8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 77.
Letter from [Joseph IUtombe] to Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Relations (Nov. 29,
1797), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 40, at 1083 (author's translation).
244 Id. (author's translation).
245 Letter from [Joseph Ltombe] to Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Relations (Dec. 2,
1797), in 2 CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 40, at 1086. In transmitting Lee's opinion to
IUtombe, Pickering indicated that "an exemption from legal process" is not one of the
rights attached to the "character" of consul-general. Letter from Timothy Pickering to
Philippe de LUtombe (Nov. 30, 1797) (manuscript copy on file with the New York
University Law Review), reprinted in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 84.
242
243
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violation of the constitution: and that the attempt would have been
as unavailing as illegal. 246
Pickering assured L6tombe that, although the Executive would not
"interpose between you & the regular operation of our laws,"
L6tombe could "justly expect the full protection of [his] rights" 247 by
the Court.
Before the Supreme Court, Jared Ingersoll and Edward Tilghman
argued on behalf of the plaintiff, Jones. 248 They claimed that "when a
Consul acts as a merchant, and draws bills for cash advanced, he is not
entitled to any privilege." 249 For support, they cited various treatises
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Waters v. Collot.250
As Attorney General Lee had predicted, the Justices were unconvinced: In a unanimous decision, they found that "there was no cause
of action" against L6tombe because "the contract was made on
account of the [French] government." 25 1The Court had personal jurisdiction over L6tombe because he was not a diplomatic official, but
L6tombe could not be held personally liable for France's debts.
Adding this case to those previously examined, the following
principles and practices can be discerned. First, the Executive believed
that it did not have the constitutional authority to order a court to
dismiss a civil suit brought by a private individual against a current or
former foreign official on conduct-based immunity grounds, although
in at least one instance the U.S. Attorney submitted a "suggestion"
that the applicable law deprived a U.S. court of jurisdiction over a
foreign public ship (Collot, Cochrane, Davis, Sinclair, and Litombe).

Second, foreigners who were not diplomatic officials were not personally immune from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts, and could therefore
be arrested and compelled to give bail to secure their appearance in a
civil suit pursuant to a writ of capias ad respondendum (Collot,
Cochrane, Sinclair, and Litombe). Third, individual foreign officials

were not liable in U.S. courts for "mere irregularities" in the exercise
of their lawful powers (Collot, Perroud, and Sinclair). Fourth, if the

defendant could show that she had acted within his or her "lawful
powers," she would be discharged on a promise to appear (Perroud).
The mere assertion that the defendant held an official title at the time
of the alleged misconduct was not sufficient for this purpose if the
246 Letter from Timothy Pickering to Philippe de Ldtombe (Nov. 30, 1797), supra note
245, at 84-85.
247 Id. at 85.
248 Jones v. Ltombe, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 384, 385 (1798).
249 Id. at 385.
250 Id.
251 Id.
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defendant posed a flight risk (Collot).2 5 2 Finally, individuals acting as
commercial agents of a foreign sovereign did not bear personal liability for debts incurred on behalf of the government; under applicable principles of agency law, the claim ran exclusively against the
principal (Litombe).253
Several problematic aspects of litigation against nondiplomatic
officials were also becoming evident during this period. First, civil
suits brought by private individuals against current or former officials
for conduct performed under the authority of a foreign sovereign created diplomatic tensions with foreign countries and forced the U.S.
Executive to manage relationships by repeatedly explaining its
inability to intervene (Collot, Cochrane, Davis, Sinclair, and
Litombe). Second, the long delays associated with litigation proved a
source of frustration for foreign defendants and their diplomatic representatives, as did the possibility that a favorable judgment could be
subject to lengthy appeals (Collot, Davis, and Sinclair). Third, plaintiffs brought claims in U.S. courts when defendants were physically
present in the United States, even when their claims related to injuries
sustained outside of U.S. territory (Collot, Davis, Sinclair, and
252 For an example of a case distinguishing between the issues of an individual defendant's official position and the lawful scope of his or her authority, see Dupont v. Pichon, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 321 (Pa. 1805). In that case, Louis Andre Pichon, the French charg6
d'affaires, was sued by a former employee who sought payment on bills of exchange that
Pichon had drawn "merely as public agent of the French republic." Id. at 323. Pichon
asserted diplomatic immunity, which would entitle him to immediate discharge, rather than
relying on his lack of personal responsibility for the debt, which he would have to plead as
a defense after giving bail. The three Justices agreed that the position of charg6 d'affaires
would entitle him to diplomatic immunity, but they hesitated whether "the notoriety of his
reception by the President" was sufficient or, as the plaintiff's counsel argued, "proof
should be produced from the secretary of state of his reception as a minister." Id. at 323-24.
Although Chief Justice Edward Shippen "seemed inclined to wait for information, from
the department of state, as to [Pichon's] actual reception by the president of that character
[of minister]," the court ultimately agreed to discharge Pichon from the process in order to
spare him from being imprisoned until such proof could be obtained. Id. at 324. On the
various forms that suggestions of immunity took prior to the 1930s, see A.H. Feller,
Procedure in Cases Involving Immunity of Foreign States in Courts of the United States, 25
AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1931).
253 Although this point might be considered a subset of the "lawful authority" point, it
seems helpful to differentiate commercial from noncommercial cases, particularly in light
of subsequent developments in the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity finding foreign
states liable but individual foreign agents not personally liable for a state's commercial
activities. See Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172, 178 (1818) (citing Jones v.
Litombe for the proposition that "all the authorities show that an agent contracting on the
behalf of government is not personally liable"); see also Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1967-1977
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,780, at 90,827 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1976)
(finding individual officials immune for a state's commercial transactions). The same
appears to have been true for "claims sounding in contract" brought against domestic officials, because "the liability did not run against the officer as such but against the government." Pfander & Hunt, supra note 18, at 1871 n.37.
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Perroud).This could create problems including lack of access to evidence and competing claims to jurisdiction by foreign tribunals, especially in prize cases.
This is where matters stood as the eighteenth century came to a
close.
II
RECLAIMING THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CASES

Part I recounted the stories of the six civil suits brought against
current or former foreign officials in the 1790s that attracted diplomatic attention. Our common law tradition has been shaped not only
by what actually transpired in those cases, but by the stories that
authoritative decision makers tell about prior judicial decisions-stories inevitably shaped by their own ideas, beliefs, and understandings.
This Part sketches the evolution of some of these stories. Because the
primary goal of this Article has been to recover the eighteenthcentury cases, my focus in this Part is to draw connections between
those cases and their uses-and misuses-in later arguments, rather
than to describe the later cases in great detail.
This Part illustrates that, by the end of the nineteenth century,
jurisprudence involving claims of conduct-based (or "ratione
materiae") immunity by current or former foreign officials began to
merge into a separate but related line of cases involving so-called
"acts of state"-that is, public acts a government performs within its
own territory, insulated from judicial scrutiny by foreign courts. 254 The
continuity between ratione materiae immunity and the act of state
doctrine is significant because many consider immunity to be a
defense against jurisdiction, whereas the act of state doctrine constitutes a substantive defense on the merits. 255 However, treating a claim
of conduct-based immunity more like an affirmative defense would
require a defendant to prove that she had acted within her "lawful
powers" in order to have a case dismissed on immunity grounds. It
would also preserve the judiciary's role as the final arbiter of whether
such a defense could succeed in specific instances.
254 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (describing the
"classic" conception of the act of state doctrine (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S.
250, 252 (1897))).
255 See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004) ("Unlike a claim of
sovereign immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine
provides foreign states with a substantive defense on the merits."); see also R[osalyn]
Higgins, Certain Unresolved Aspects of the Law of State Immunity, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV.
265, 275 (1982) (indicating, with respect to the immunity of the foreign state itself, that
"[o]ne of the most complicated and difficult areas is the relationship between the concept
of State immunity and that of act of State").
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Some of the eighteenth-century cases described above may have
been "forgotten" because they were unreported, even though the
related Attorney General opinions survived. Waters v. Collot is an
exception. Plaintiff Jones invoked Waters to support his claim that
French consul-general Joseph L6tombe should be personally liable for
debts incurred by him on behalf of the French Republic. 256 The claim
did not succeed, reflecting the principle that an individual acting
merely as a commercial agent will not incur personal financial responsibility 257-a proposition for which the Jones v. Litombe case was
itself subsequently cited. 258
One might expect that the next judicial reference to the 1790s
immunity cases would be the 1812 case Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon,259 which is often cited as the original foreign sovereign
immunity case, 260 even though Schooner Exchange postdates the cases
studied here by almost twenty years. Schooner Exchange involved an
in rem action against a ship in the possession and use of a foreign
sovereign, not a claim against an individual. Because individual
conduct-based immunity was not at issue, the existing body of case
law relating to official immunity does not appear to have figured in
the arguments. It was not because the lawyers involved were not
aware of those cases. In fact, Alexander Dallas, who was intimately
familiar with the precedents explored in Part I, played a significant
role in Schooner Exchange as the U.S. Attorney for the District of
Pennsylvania.
Following his predecessor William Rawle's example in the
Cassius case, Dallas filed a "suggestion" informing the district court
that applicable law did not permit attachment of the foreign ship, even
256 Supra note 250 and accompanying text.
257 See supra note 251 and accompanying text (describing the decision in Jones v.
Litombe). But cf Saorstat & Cont'1 S.S. Co. v. Rafael de las Morenas, [1945] I.R. 291, 300
(Ir.) (finding that a colonel in the Spanish army who had contracted to carry horses from
Dublin to Lisbon for use by the Spanish army was not entitled to immunity because "[h]e is
sued in his personal capacity and the judgment which has been, or any judgment which
may hereafter be, obtained against him will bind merely the appellant personally, and any
such judgment cannot be enforced against any property save that of the appellant").
258 See, e.g., Duvall v. Craig, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 45, 56 n.a (1817) (citing Jones v.
Litombe for the proposition that a public agent generally will not incur personal liability
for contracts entered into on behalf of the government); Passmore v. Mott, 2 Binn. 201,
201-02 (Pa. 1809) (citing Jones v. Litombe to support the finding that the defendant did
not incur personal responsibility when he acted as the secretary of an incorporated company and the plaintiffs did not rely on his individual credit).
259 Schooner Exchange v. M[c]Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
260 See, e.g., Note, InterpretingSilence: The Roles of the Courts and the Executive Branch
in Head of State Immunity Cases, 124 HARV. L. REv. 2042, 2044 (2011) ("[T]he 1812
Supreme Court case Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon remains the general starting point
for discussions of sovereign immunity in American law.").
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though it had come into a U.S. port. 261 The district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' claim, but the circuit court reversed. On appeal before the
Supreme Court, U.S. Attorney Dallas and Attorney General William
Pinkney argued that certain property of a foreign sovereign was
entitled to absolute immunity akin to the absolute, status-based
immunity of a diplomat or foreign head of state. As Pinkney
explained: "We claim for this vessel, an immunity from the ordinary
jurisdiction, as extensive as that of an ambassador, or of the Sovereign
himself;-but no further.... The jurisdiction over things and persons,
is the same in substance. The arrest of the thing is to obtain jurisdiction over the person." 262 This echoes Rawle's argument that attaching
the Cassius would implead France-an argument that Rawle did not
make about the proceedings against Captain Davis.263
Chief Justice John Marshall delivered the Court's opinion that the
ship was not subject to attachment. He indicated that the Court was
"exploring an unbeaten path, with few, if any, aids from precedents or
written law." 264 He situated this case within a "class of cases in which
every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of that
complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be
the attribute of every nation." 265 None of the examples within the
"class of cases" enumerated by Marshall reflects the fact patterns seen
in the earlier cases brought against foreigners who were not diplomatic officials. Schooner Exchange fits most comfortably within the
Cassius line of cases on the immunity of public ships and states themselves, which Chief Justice Marshall considered alongside the statusbased immunity of heads of state and ambassadors. Seen in this way,
the jurisprudential foundation for claims to immunity based on the
official character of an individual's conduct begins not with Schooner
Exchange but instead with Waters v. Collot and the other cases

examined in Part I, and continues with nineteenth-century cases on
the act of state doctrine.
If the 1790s precedents canvassed above were not deemed relevant to suits against foreign ships (and vice versa), they were nonetheless cited in cases against individuals. In 1818, a suit was filed against
261 Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117-19.
262 Id. at 132-33.

263 See supra notes 157-59 and accompanying text (describing Rawle's arguments in the
proceedings against Captain Davis in the Cassius case).
264 Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
265 Id. at 187. For more on the historical evolution of the immunity of foreign ships, see
Recent Decisions, InternationalLaw-Admiralty-Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Vessels,
45 COLUM. L. REv. 80 (1945) and Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign
Vessels in Anglo-American Law: The Evolution of a Legal Doctrine, 25 MiNN. L. REV. 1
(1940).
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Louis Aury, a French privateer, in the U.S. District Court for the
District of South Carolina. 266 Aury allegedly raided and sank the
Spanish ship Conception. When Aury landed in Charleston, the owner
267
of the Conception, Hernandez, brought suit.
The district court discharged Aury and dismissed the case on the
established grounds that a neutral court, sitting in admiralty, "will
carefully avoid taking cognizance of prize matters of foreign nations,
occurring upon the high seas." 268 It distinguished Waters v. Collot as a
contrary example in which, unlike the case at bar, the court properly
assumed jurisdiction because the "tort [was] only considered as a
marine trespass, and not an incident of a case jure belli." 269 The
court's refusal to exercise jurisdiction in Hernandez v. Aury turned on
its characterization of the action as "incidental to the question of
prize" 270-that is, the lawfulness of Aury's capture of a suspected
enemy ship. The trial judge made a special point to indicate that the
case's disposition did not in any way depend on "the military grade of
the defendant who is before me; or the authority by which he acted at
the time the capture was made," 271 but purely on the grounds of neutrality. The special rules governing prize cases thus prevented the
need for further delineation of the scope of individual conduct-based
immunity, leaving Waters v. Collot as the most authoritative precedent in this area.
During the nineteenth century, the Executive appears not to have
changed its posture of non-intervention in suits against individuals
who acted on behalf of foreign governments, even though it did
submit suggestions in suits against foreign ships. In 1841, the New
York Supreme Court of Judicature considered the potential immunity
from suit of Alexander McLeod, a British subject and former deputy
sheriff of the Niagara District in Upper Canada. McLeod faced criminal and civil charges for his alleged involvement in the 1837 attack on
the steamboat Caroline, in which U.S. citizen Amos Durfee was
killed.2 7 2 Secretary of State Daniel Webster echoed Attorney General
266 Hernandez v. Aury, 12 F. Cas. 33 (D.S.C. 1818).
267 Id. at 33.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 34.
272 People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 379-81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841). For additional discussion,
see John E. Noyes, The Caroline: International Law Limits on Resort to Force, in
INTERNATIONAL LAw STORIEs 263 (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis
eds., 2007), David J. Bederman, The Cautionary Tale of Alexander McLeod: Superior
Orders and the American Writ of Habeas Corpus, 41 EMORY L.J. 515 (1992), and R.Y.
Jennings, The Carolineand McLeod Cases, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 82 (1938).
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Bradford's disavowal of the authority to order McLeod's discharge
and release, even though McLeod allegedly had been acting under
British orders. Webster wrote to British Minister Henry Fox that "Her
Majesty's government must be fully aware, that in the United States,
as in England, persons confined under judicial process can be released
from that confinement only by judicial process." 273 He continued: "[It
is quite clear that the Executive Government cannot interfere to
arrest a civil suit, between private parties, in any stage of its progress;
but that such suit must go on to its regular judicial termination." 2 7 4
This was true, Webster wrote, notwithstanding the President's opinion
that McLeod's claim of "immunity from personal responsibility by
virtue of the law of nations" (which McLeod raised in a habeas proceeding) would succeed in state court if McLeod presented "authentic
evidence of the avowal by the British Government, of the attack on
and destruction of 'The Caroline,' as acts done under its authority." 275
The New York Supreme Court (the highest court of general jurisdiction sitting in New York at the time) rejected McLeod's claim to
immunity from personal responsibility for his alleged acts (without
reference to the Collot decision).276 McLeod presented an alibi
defense at trial and was ultimately acquitted by the jury. 2 7 7
Half a century later-nearly a full century after the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court refused to discharge General Collot on the grounds of
conduct-based immunity-the Second Circuit issued its opinion in
Underhill v. Hernandez, which is often cited as the origin of the act of
state doctrine in the United States. 278 On November 5, 1893, the New
York Times reported that former U.S. Consul George Underhill and
his wife had filed a suit against Jos6 Manuel Hernandez, a Venezuelan
General and Senator, and obtained an order for his arrest in New
273 Letter from Mr. Webster to Mr. Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in People v. McLeod,
25 Wend. *483, *513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
277 Bederman, supra note 272, at 526. With respect to official acts done on the foreign
state's own territory, however, the New York Supreme Court ruled in Hatch v. Baez that
the former president of the Dominican Republic was not "amenable to the jurisdiction of
the courts of this State" for "the acts of another government done within its own territory."
14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596, 599 (Gen. Term 1876). This ruling, which relies on Schooner
Exchange v. M[c]Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), and Santissima Trinidad,20 U.S.
(7 Wheat.) 283 (1822), rather than the 1790s cases explored above, will be examined in
future work on the nineteenth-century evolution of the act of state doctrine.
278 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 580, 583 (2d Cir. 1895) ("[W]e conclude that
the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and, as such, are
not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government."), aff'd on
other grounds, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
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York. 279 The Underhills alleged that Hernandez had imprisoned them
in Ciudad Bolivar, where Underhill operated water works under a
concession from the previous government, and that Hernandez had
compelled Underhill to sell his plant and property "for a pittance." 280
The Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York directed a
verdict for Hernandez at the conclusion of the trial "upon the ground
that because the acts of the defendant were those of a military commander, representing a de facto government in the prosecution of a
war, he was not civilly responsible therefor." 281 Underhill appealed
the directed verdict.
The Second Circuit affirmed. It found that the evidence
presented at trial was "not sufficient to have warranted a finding by
the jury that the defendant was actuated by malice, or any personal or
private motive." 282 It also articulated the principle that "the acts of the
official representatives of the state are those of the state itself, when
exercised within the scope of their delegated powers." 283 (By then, the
United States had recognized the revolutionary forces commanded by
General Hernandez as the legitimate government of Venezuela. 284) In
support of its decision to affirm the directed verdict, the Second
Circuit cited the Attorney General's letters in the Collot and Sinclair
cases for the proposition that "[t]he law officers of the United States
have uniformly advised the executive department that individuals are
not answerable in foreign tribunals for acts done in their own country,
in behalf of their government, by virtue of their official
authority" 285-even though, as detailed above, this did not mean that
such individuals could avoid being arrested in the United States and
compelled to respond to a suit. The Second Circuit held that, based on
the trial record, "the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and, as such, are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government." 286
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision. 287
While Chief Justice Fuller wrote for the court that "acts of legitimate
279 Bail Came Just in Time, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1893, at 9.
280 Id.

281 Underhill, 65 F. at 579, 583. The reasoning in Underhill stands in contrast to the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals's earlier decision in Hedges v. Price, 2 W. Va. 192
(1867), which held that a former member of the Confederate army could be held civilly
liable for trespass and theft for carrying away the plaintiffs' goods under orders from his
superiors for the use of the Confederate army.
282 Underhill, 65 F. at 579.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 578.
285 Id. at 580.
286 Id. at 583.

287 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 254 (1897).
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warfare cannot be made the basis of individual liability," 288 his
opinion is more often cited for its statement that "the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory." 289 Limits on individual responsibility, judicial competence, and territorial jurisdiction thus became
entwined with a broader principle of judicial non-intervention in cases
involving "acts of the government of another done within its own territory"-the affirmative defense now known as the act of state
doctrine.
Following Underhill, the precise relationship between foreign
state immunity, foreign official immunity, and the act of state doctrine
remained blurred. For example, in 1924, the Second Circuit found in
Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico that Mexico was immune

from U.S. jurisdiction in an action for breach of contract. 290 In support
of Mexico's immunity, the court cited the Attorney General's letters
in the Collot and Sinclair cases, as well as its own previous decision in
Underhill.291 In so doing, the Second Circuit did not differentiate
between suits against individuals and suits against states themselves,
or between immunity from jurisdiction and a substantive defense on
the merits. Instead, it articulated a general proposition that "for illegal
acts committed in a foreign state the judicial tribunals of that state will
afford proper redress." 292 This overly broad statement was only partially cured by the court's later clarification that its dismissal was
based on the limited ground that "the public property of Mexico. . . is
entitled to the same immunity as a sovereign, or an ambassador, or a
ship of war, and for the same reason," 293 thereby placing Oliver
American Trading Co. within the line of cases on status-based (as
opposed to conduct-based) immunity.
As the twentieth century progressed, relatively few cases were
brought against individuals acting on behalf of foreign governments.
Judicial discussions of the scope of conduct-based immunity and the
at 253.
at 252.
290 Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 5 F.2d 659, 660, 666-67 (2d Cir. 1924). In so
holding, the court took judicial notice of the fact that, in countries where the government
owns and operates the railways, "[t]his is not regarded by them as engaging in trade, but as
the performance of a fundamental governmental function." Id. at 665.
291 Id. at 662.
292 Id. In fact, the 1871 Attorney General opinion that the court cites in support of this
general proposition found that seeking local redress (what we would now term "exhaustion
of local remedies") was not required where such an attempt would be futile. See New
Granadian Passenger-Tax, 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 547, 550-51 (1871) (opining that the principle
of exhaustion did not apply because the government of New Granada had taken the position that the acts complained of were lawful).
293 Oliver Am. Trading Co., 5 F.2d at 667.
288 Id.
289 Id.

Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

756

[Vol. 87:704

role of the Executive remained scarce. 294 In the meantime, the act of
state doctrine continued to evolve. In 1963, the petitioner in Banco
Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino cited Waters v. Collot in its brief to the
Supreme Court.295 Sabbatino involved the Cuban government's
expropriation of sugar owned by an American company. The brief
submitted by the Cuban bank argued that U.S. courts were required
to give legal effect to the nationalization decrees and grant summary
judgment to the bank because there were "no substantial issues of fact
requiring trial." 296 The brief cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
decision in Waters v. Collot, as well as Attorney General Bradford's
related letter, in a footnote, and characterized Collot as one of the
earliest cases applying the act of state doctrine. 297
These occasional citations to the 1790s cases did not fully clarify
the relationship between jurisdictional immunity and entitlement to
summary judgment, or between status-based and conduct-based
immunity. These distinctions became increasingly important as more
claims were brought against current or former foreign officials in U.S.
courts.2 98 After making its appearance in the Sabbatino brief, the case
against Collot does not appear to have resurfaced as a precedent until
the United States filed its 2006 Statement of Interest in Matar v.
Dichter, which cited the opinions by Attorneys General Bradford and
Lee. 2 9 9 Collot and Sinclair, rescued from oblivion, soon found themselves in the middle of a doctrinal maelstrom, as their eighteenthcentury misadventures became fodder for twenty-first-century legal
arguments.
CONCLUSIONS

This Article has sought to illuminate the process and substance of
common law immunity for nondiplomatic officials as it was understood during the late eighteenth century and beyond. It has emphasized the important, but often overlooked, distinction between the
status-based immunity from jurisdiction accorded heads of state,
294 On the paucity of cases against individuals who were not heads of state in the two
decades preceding the enactment of the FSIA, see Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the
Department of State: May 1952 to January 1977, 1977 DIGEST app. at 1020, and Keitner,
Common Law, supra note 17, at 72-73 (describing these four cases).
295 Brief for Petitioner at 14 n.3, Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964) (No. 16).
296 Id. at 11.

297 Id. at 14 n.3. Louis Henkin's subsequent article on Sabbatino cites the Collot case as
one that carried "echoes" of the act of state doctrine. Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 805 (1964).
298 See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (describing suits against officials).
299 Supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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diplomatic officials, and ships in the possession and use of a foreign
sovereign, and the. affirmative defense that a particular action was
within the scope of a foreign official's "lawful powers." 3 Clarifying
this distinction constitutes an important first step toward formulating
the standards that will govern jurisdictional immunity, as well as dismissal for failure to state a claim or entitlement to summary judgment,
in cases against current or former foreign officials.
The materials examined lead to the observation that conductbased (or ratione materiae) immunity was treated like an affirmative
defense to be pleaded by the defendant, and not a basis for Executive
intervention in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The origins of
the act of state doctrine and ratione materiae immunity may be so
closely intertwined precisely because both represent substantive
defenses to be pleaded on the merits.
Several enduring principles emerged during this early period. A
defendant who acted as a commercial agent would not bear personal
liability for debts incurred on behalf of a foreign state because the
foreign state itself was the real party in interest.301 U.S. courts also
declined to adjudicate claims that were incidental to the capture of a
suspected enemy ship because, as a matter of prize law, these disputes
were subject exclusively to the jurisdiction of the captor's courts.
Other acts performed within the scope of a foreign official's
lawful powers were also insulated from review by U.S. courts. In these
cases, it was not that the court lacked jurisdiction over the individual if
she was found within the United States and was not a diplomatic official or head of state. Instead, as in the commercial agent cases, there
was no cause of action against the individual personally because she
did not bear personal responsibility for the challenged acts. It was not
300 Timothy Pickering used the term "lawful powers" in his May 29, 1797 letter to
Joseph L6tombe. Letter from Timothy Pickering to Mr. Letombe, Consul General of the
French Republic (May 29, 1797), supra note 100. In order to secure discharge on common
bail, a defendant foreign official was required to provide certification from the foreign
government that the "act which occasioned the injury complained of had been within his
lawful powers." Id. Pickering's formulation leaves open the question of whether such a
certification could be challenged on the grounds that the authorization was itself unlawful,
or that the action exceeded the scope of authority that any government could lawfully
confer.
301 This principle was reaffirmed in Greenspan v. Crosbie, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) %95,780, at 90,827 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1976), in which individual
foreign officials were deemed immune from suit for alleged violations of Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act. Similarly, when a plaintiff seeks financial recovery from a
foreign state but names an individual defendant, the state is the real party in interest and
the case against the individual should be dismissed. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278, 2292 (2010) ("[Ilt may be the case that some actions against an official in his official
capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state is the real
party in interest.").
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settled in the late eighteenth century, and it remains unsettled today,
what type of evidence of action within lawful powers was sufficient to
secure dismissal on this basis.
As the 1790s cases illustrate, the situation becomes more complicated when an individual allegedly has exceeded the scope of his
authority, 302 or when the authority given (for example, to torture) was
unlawful under the domestic law of the place where the conduct
occurred, under international law, or under the law of a third state. In
these scenarios, the forum state might recognize a cause of action
against the individual personally notwithstanding his or her .actual or
apparent authority. The hard question is whether a claim of common
law immunity will nevertheless prevent the case from moving forward.
If such a claim is grounded in eighteenth-century precedents, my
assessment is that an assertion of conduct-based immunity will not
serve as a jurisdictional bar to proceedings, and that a court must
assess whether applicable substantive law imposes personal responsibility for the alleged conduct.
If applicable law does reach the alleged conduct, a version of the
act of state doctrine might still have a role in securing dismissal, especially if the alleged conduct falls within what one might call a "margin
of appreciation" within which sovereign states permit each other
leeway to act without foreign judicial scrutiny.303 This is a more limited basis for dismissal, however, than the blanket claim that current
or former officials are immune from jurisdiction for all acts performed
on behalf of a foreign state.
As for the Executive's role, it is clear that the current practice of
submitting suggestions or statements of interest can be useful to
courts in cases involving both conduct- and status-based immunity.
That said, it is important to recognize that the Executive previously
believed that certain forms of intervention in a civil suit against a foreign official would be constitutionally prohibited. The Executive has
not taken full account of its own early disavowal of constitutional
authority in this area. In its amicus curiae brief in Samantar, the
United States erroneously asserted that foreign officials have always
had immunity "[r]ooted [i]n" the exclusive discretion of the executive
302 Cf. Gill v. Brown, 12 Johns. 385, 386 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815) (finding personal liability
for a public officer who acted beyond the scope of his authority when he entered into an
agreement with the plaintiff).
303 See Kenneth C. Randall & Chimbne I. Keitner, Sabbatino, Sosa, and "Super
Norms," in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 559, 565 (Mahnoush H. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2011) (drawing a line of

continuity between Sabbatino and Sosa as delineating the authority of the U.S. judiciary
vis-A-vis the political branches and foreign sovereigns).
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branch. 304 In fact, the practice of judicial deference to the Executive
crystallized only in the 1930s and arose in the context of in rem
proceedings against foreign ships, not suits against foreign officials.305
There does not appear to be any long-standing practice of judicial deference to executive determinations of individual conduct-based immunity.3 0 6 This does not mean that the Executive must embrace its
previous disavowals, but it does open a space for critical reflection
about the Executive's appropriate role and the allocation of authority
between the Executive and the judiciary in cases against nondiplomatic officials.
The eighteenth-century cases involving claims to foreign official
immunity can also be read alongside other cases raising foreignrelations concerns. The Supreme Court has suggested "a policy of
case-specific deference to the political branches" under which "federal
courts should give serious weight to the Executive Branch's view of [a]
case's impact on foreign policy" 307 before exercising jurisdiction.
Although, in most cases, one might expect that giving "serious
weight" to the Executive's views will produce the same result as absolute judicial deference, the distinction between serious weight and
absolute deference is not insignificant. The materials explored here
thus contribute to a growing body of literature challenging the historical basis for judicial deference to the Executive branch in cases that
implicate foreign affairs. 308 In practical terms, if the Executive does
not have the final word on conduct-based immunity determinations, it
304 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 27, Samantar
v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555). Professor David Stewart, previously an
Assistant Legal Adviser for the Department of State, has also taken this position. See
Stewart, supra note 15, at 646.
305 See Keitner, Common Law, supra note 17, at 73 & n.44 (noting this change in degree
of judicial deference); Wuerth, supra note 17, at 925-27 (same).
306 In the 1950s and 1960s, there were only four immunity determinations involving individual officials who were neither diplomats nor heads of state, and in only one of these
cases is it clear that the court believed itself to be bound by an Executive determination.
Semonian v. Crosbie (D. Mass. 1974) (no decision located); Sovereign Immunity Decisions
of the Department of State: May 1952 to January 1977, supra note 294, at 1062 (citing Cole
v. Heitman (S.D.N.Y. 1968)); Waltier v. Thomson, 189 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Greenspan, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95, 780; see Sovereign Immunity Decisions of the
Department of State: May 1952 to January 1977, supra note 294, at 1020 (chronicling
Executive consideration of requests for suggestions of immunity in the period between the
Tate letter and the passage of the FSIA); Keitner, Common Law, supra note 17, at 73
(noting that there is no stable conduct-based immunity standard of total deference to the
Executive).
307 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
308 See, e.g., David L. Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty
Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 505 (2007)
(indicating that in its first fifty years, the Supreme Court did not defer to executive branch
treaty interpretations); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in
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can potentially deflect some of the diplomatic pressures brought by
foreign governments seeking conduct-based immunity for their
officials and mitigate concerns that immunity determinations are
based solely on political considerations 309-the same concerns that led
Congress to enact the FSIA to govern the immunity of foreign states
themselves.310
Absent further congressional action, the immunity of foreign officials not covered by applicable treaties or statutes will be determined
under the "common law of official immunity," not the FSIA. 311 The
common law, understood broadly, comprises a series of choices by
authoritative decision makers from which subsequent decision makers
have constructed a set of constraints that relevant actors understand
as legally binding. By chronicling early choices regarding foreign official immunity, this Article builds a foundation for a more informed
conversation about the shape that the "common law of official immunity" can and should take going forward. As U.S. courts and other
decision makers struggle to achieve a balance among affording individuals judicial recourse for their injuries, holding wrongdoers
accountable without scapegoating bureaucrats, and preserving
peaceful relations with foreign countries, they might take some comfort in the fact that their eighteenth-century predecessors struggled
with remarkably similar issues.
By highlighting the fluid and shifting nature of understandings in
this area, this Article will likely add to the general discomfort with
federal common lawmaking that pushes decision makers toward
Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court's Docket, 114 YALE L.J. 855
(2005) (documenting a high degree of judicial involvement in early foreign affairs).
. 309 The ability of the Executive to deflect criticism of its apparent inaction may serve a
practical purpose. Former State Department Legal Adviser Davis Robinson recounts an
exchange between Secretary of State George Shultz and Chinese leader Deng Xiao Ping
about the possible attachment of a Chinese aircraft by a U.S. court:
Apparently Shultz met with him and I was told that Deng Xiao Ping became
highly annoyed and said . . . "Why don't you just call that judge down in Alabama and tell him to lay off the People's Republic of China." And apparently
Shultz replied, "Oh, we have the separation of powers, you have to understand." And Deng Xiao Ping said, "Well, what is the separation of powers?"
Shultz answered, "I'll send you my lawyer to explain it."
MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERN17ATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL
ADVISER 44 (2010). The letters sent by Secretaries of State Randolph and Pickering to
British and French ministers might be seen as the eighteenth-century equivalent of
Schultz's statement, "I'll send you my lawyer to explain it."
310 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285 (2010) (No. 08-1555) (noting that
Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976 in response to the "inconsistent application of sovereign immunity").
311 Id. at 2290 & n.14.
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statutory solutions. If this Article has succeeded in challenging historical generalizations about the absolute immunity of foreign officials
from suit in U.S. courts, and the established role of the Executive in
issuing binding suggestions of conduct-based immunity, then such discomfort is-in my view-a worthwhile price to pay.
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